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Feeling guilty is an experience we all know. It is a condition 
that ensures we remain cognisant of our obligations to our-
selves and to others so that we live within the bounds of 
appropriate behaviour. When obligations are violated and 
deviance is evident, the resultant dissonance between expected 
and contrary behaviour generates feelings of inner environment 
discomfort and self-criticism recognised as guilt feelings. 
Whether such states of internal dissonance are psychodynamical-
ly induced, as Freud maintained, or are the result of not 
meeting ethical obligations, as decreed by particular religious 
systems, or are due to an inevitable faculty of being human, 
they have to be controlled if the mental health of the indi-
vidual experiencing them is not to be detrimentally affected. 
What psychology and religion have to say about ensuring that 
this control is effective has unfortunately become dichotomous 
and disparate realms of discourse. A common discourse is 
necessary if the insights of each are to most effectively 
deal with mental health care. To this end, this thesis is 
presented as a means for assisting psychotherapists in a 
re-assessment of the interface between psychology and religion. 
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ABSTRACT 
The dissonance of guilt is presented as a fundamental dynamic 
in the human condition. A phenomenological account of how 
guilt is experienced in individual functioning, Freud's theory 
of personality functioning and the Biblical Christian con-
ception of the individual are presented as paradigmatic expla-
nations of the condition and its features. That these para-
digms in their distinct realms of discourse are equally 
concerned with optimal personal functioning, but are 
compromised by differences in theory and method, means mental 
heal th care is disserviced. This thesis examines the 
similarities and differences in psychological and religious 
approaches to the dissonance of guilt, and, with particular 
reference to the psychoanalytic method of psychotherapy and 
the Christian tradition of confession, suggests some 
re-definitions of concepts and terms useful for a new discourse 
in clarifying the interface between psychology and religion. 
Literature in Clinical Psychology, Philosophy, Religious 
Studies, Psychotherapy, Psychology, Psychology of Religion, 
Sociology of Religion, Philosophy or Religion, Ethics, Moral 
Philosophy, Linguistics, Christian Studies and Biblical Studies 
have been the main sources of information and ideas. These 
·resources have enabled an eclectic synthesis to be made of 
what has been perceived to be the principle features and 
implications of the individual who feels guilty. The thesis 
iv 
is thus an appraisal of the situation of such individuals 
as they find themselves in the milieu of psychological and 
religious systems of thought. 
The conclusions of this thesis suggest 
disparity between the realms of religious 
discourse can be resolved when their 
that the apparent 
and psychological 
similarities are 
strengthened while still valuing their differences. In doing 
so the task of the psychotherapist for dealing with the 
dissonance of guilt feelings can greatly be assisted by 
incorporating the implications of the patient's religious 
background and predelictions, as well as by using the resources 
religions offer for meeting the religious needs of the 
individual human condition. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
DISSONANCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION 
Human beings live their lives not only in the present. They 
remember what has happened to them and think about the future. 
This is why each individual is a unique conglomeration of 
memories, expectations, and particular here-and-now percep-
tions. In addition, as social beings, humans communicate 
and share life. These interactions invariably influence 
what the individual perceives, remembers and expects. 
The individual's perceptions and expectations can differ 
and conflict with those of the ambient society. The individual 
can also experience conflict within when two or more thoughts 
differ and demand different outcomes. When a situation of 
such internal conflict 
dissonance. This term 
occurs, 
refers 
the individual is experiencing 
to the internal state of ex-
periencing incongruity and disharmony when two different 
entities of thought contend for the suppression of the other. 
Dissonance is thus the feeling and the actuality of incon-
gruity. Psychological and religious discourse have much 
to say about states of dissonance which is implicitly and 
explicitly inherent in what they say about the human condition. 
In the human condition, incongruity and feelings of dissonance 
are primarily realized because the individual functions as 
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a 'unit' at two levels. The first level is as a part and 
product of the environment. l At this level, the individual 
'unit' functions within a purely physical existence, with 
drives for bodily survival, and, to a certain extent, identity 
survival as an undifferentiated part of the environment. 
As such a biophysical unit, the individual has and is a sepa-
rate identity, but this 'identity' is not realized by the 
individual. 
The realization of identity is a function of the 'me' , the 
second level of personality functioning, and is realized 
in one of three ways. The first is as spectator or witness, 
aware of present and past interactions with the environment. 
The second is as an ally that identifies and connects with 
others to whom the individual feels a sense of belonging 
in facing the environment. This sense of belonging means 
there is an awareness of the self as a particular type that 
shares with other units a special similar kind of conscious-
ness. The third is the image level which the individual 
holds about what kind of person he or she is with an awareness 
of having characteristics and traits. There is thus an aware-
ness of being the sum total of a particular conglomeration 
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of the environment and a particularized 
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individuality of 




As such, it can and does feel 
environment and yet inextricably 
connected to it. Because this level of identity is dependent 
upon the environment, there exists a tension between 
separateness and connection. Individuals question their 
relationship to the environment and the components of it. 
This is because, at this level, the individual is not simply 
the undifferentiated 'unit' as in the first level. In this 
second level, the individual sees him or herself as separated, 
conflicting or interwoven with the environment and takes 
note of drives for survival, or, perhaps more accurately, 
their consequences, particularly states of dissonance, the 
cause of them and the discomfort they engender. 
This chapter is in three parts. In the first, three issues 
in the cause of dissonance, namely drives, needs, and goals, 
psychology and religion will r be examined. The second part 
considers the different types of psychological and religious 
dissonance. Finally, the third part presents some of the 
ways for dealing with dissonance. The chapter thus serves 
as an introduction to the broad fields of dissonance, 
psychology and religion before particular statements in 




CAUSES OF DISSONANCE 
(A} DRIVES, NEEDS AND GOALS 
Because humankind functions with a mixing of the two levels 
of identity, as a biophysical unit that observes and thinks 
about itself, theoretically separating instinctual, unprocessed 
drives from processed drives is problematic. Basically drives 
establish the individual in experience by directing his or 
her interactions with the environment. 2 They are what Freud 
refers to as instincts and what are referred to as desires 
in ethical discourse.3 
In either event, drives can be defined as unobservable moti-
vating forces which incite action. They arise, in context, 
from states of need and seek the achievement of some goal. ' 
Hunger, thirst and sexual gratification are three principle 
needs that illustrate the drive-need-goal relationship. For 
example, an internal state of hunger establishes the need 
for food, with the goal of eating food and not feeling hungry 
initiating the drive to obtain food to eat. 
As such, drives, needs and goals are concerned with the survi-
val of the biophysical unit and the concomitant psychological 
well-being of the individual. Accordingly, drives work to 
5 
ensure a state of equilibrium in the internal environment 
of the individual, by satisfying needs and achieving goals 
arising out of situations occurring in the basic processes 
of living. These processes include autonomic ones like hunger, 
thirst, sex and sleep as well as the more intrinsic, self-
initiated ones like creative work and intellectual activity. 
Regardless of cause and context, drives respond to specific 
situations in the internal environment of the individual. 
They motivate towards some activity or decision response. 
In this way, drives seek the achievement of goals by satisfying 
needs, instigating a driving force which induces the individual 
to act. In combination with goals, drives thus create the 
motivation which essentially expresses needs. The motivation 
of finding food or writing a poem, for example, express the 
need to eat or be creative, respectively. These needs initiate 
the drives of hunger and creativity and seek the goals of 
feeling not hungry and of having written the poem. 
Drives can thus be differentiated as either concerned with 
the goals of individual identity and physical body survival, 
or with species and social survival. These two kinds of 
drive together form the life drive but differ in the nature 
of their goals. Identity or body survival drives have the 
goal of ensuring the unit survives and that it does so in 
a state of pleasure. Freud's notion of the 'pleasure prin-
ciple' operating to avoid pain usefully explains this.4 
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Societal or species survival drives, on the other hand, seek 
the survival of the species. 
Because humankind has intermeshed both individual and species 
survival with societal constructs, drives in the realm of 
individual survival need to be viewed as being concerned 
with ensuring the survival of society. The individual incor-
porates and subscribes to, or may be in conflict with, drives 
seeking the maintenance of the society and its values. It 
is here that conflict situations between individual drives, 
needs and goals, in 
conflict 
the form of norms and values, occur. 
Because of of interests, the 
feelings can occur due to breaching 
individual's or society's expectations 
one are met in denial of the other.S 
dissonance of guilt 
or transgressing the 
when the needs of 
Thus, drives can be seen as the direct channelling of energy 
towards certain goals in order to fulfil certain needs in 
what is not an easy or straightforward process. The fulfilment 
of certain needs through the denial of others can cause dis-
sonance within the individual. Similarly, conflicting goals 
and incompatible needs can complicate the process and prevent 
the individual from maximizing the possibilities for pleasur-
able individual or social survival in a state of mental health 
and well-being. 
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(B) Psychology and Dissonance 
In psychological discourse, mental heal th is considered to 
be contingent on the 
appropriate thoughts 
to cope effectively. 
individual experiencing and expressing 
and behaviours that enable individuals 
That is, the state of mental health 
is indicative of a person who feels at ease with the environ-
ment and is able to cope with experience. Accordingly, the 
individual feels, acts and copes appropriately. Everyday 
experience and its inevitable ups and downs are not unrealis-
tically questioned. Neither are excessive debilitating feel-
ings or questions of self-doubt experienced in this state.6 
When the individual 
feelings of conflict, 
too much difficulty. 
thoughts, feelings 
does experience uncomfortable, inner 
these are generally resolved without 
Conflict occurs when two beliefs, 
or actions disagree. Their mutual 
inconsistency manifests a discrepancy in the individual's 
inner environment. Because this discrepancy cannot immediately 
be dismissed or denied, nagging, incessant feelings of discord 
are produced as the two contrary cognitions compete for supre-
macy through the suppression of the other. 
This condition is called a state of dissonance and has been 
theorized about in two ways in psychological discourse in 
attempts to explain the causes and the consequences of healthy 
and unhealthy dissonance. One theory focuses on dissonance 
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in terms of its cognitive dynamics. As such it is the . theory 
of cognitive dissonance in Social Psychology. The other 
theory focuses on the psychodynamics of the causes of inner 
conflict. 
The work of Sigmund Freud (1923)7 is a paramount example 
of this second approach. His theory of personality functioning 
can be construed as one that attempts to explain the aetiology 
and the prognosis of dissonance within the individual. This 
is because Freud was concerned to develop a theory of neurosis, 
and feelings of dissonance can be of a neurotic nature. Hence, 
Freud's constructs of defence mechanisms can be seen as 
dissonance-controlling-mechanisms 
flicts as forms of dissonance. 
and intra-psychic con-
The work of Leon Festinger (1957)8 is the principle contribu-
tion in the theory of cognitive dissonance. This theory 
focuses on the cognitive processes of the individual. It 
works from the premise that individual's strive for inner 
consonance and harmony of their thoughts. Thoughts are seen 
as consisting of different cognitive structures which are 
pieces of knowledge about something. The theory asserts 
that these pieces of knowledge are cognitions. Two different 
cognitions can create dissonance when their opposition leads 
to uncomfortable psychological tension. This tension is 
unpleasant and distressful and motivates the individual to 
try to restore consonance. 
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An example illustrates this. The cognition 'Smoking is un-
healthy' is consonant with the cognition 'I do not smoke' 
but will, as the theory posits, be in dissonance with the 
cognition ' I 
the levels 
am a smoker and want to be heal thy. ' 
of dissonance thereby created and 
is proportionate 
attaches to the 
are in opposition. 
to the level of importance the 





This proportionment relates to a prerequisite for the arousal 
of feelings of dissonance. This prerequisite is that some 
aspect of the individual's self-concept is challenged by 
the content of their cognitions. That is, in terms of the 
example, if the smoker was not health-conscious or could 
lie about smoking, dissonance would not eventuate because 
states of dissonance are dependent on feelings of opposition, 
discomfort and discord as well as a degree of self-interest. 
There is a measure of similarity between cognitive and psycho-
dynamic forms of dissonance because the inner environment 
of the individual can theoretically be affected by both. 
This means that for mental health, all dissonance needs to 
be brought to and dealt with at the conscious level of aware-
ness and resolved there. If not, continued dissonance may 
have considerable debilitating consequences. 
The basic psychology of the phenomenology of the individual 
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outlined above indicated dissonance resulted when individuals 
felt a sense of discomfort over breaching norms. Norms were 
seen as established either by the self, others or society. 
In either event they were perceived as important by the indi-
vidual. Hence, norms, expectations and values that were 
breached, not met, or devalued, all contributed towards feel-
ings of personal discomfort because the breach invariably 
initiates questions regarding the self-concept and evaluations 
of it. Such a crises in self-concept generates debilitating 
dissonance. 
Psychological theory perceives dissonance as that cognitive 
or psychodynamic state arising out of similar situations 
of personally felt discomfort. Conflict in these situations 
is the result of discordant cognitions or psychic entities. 
These put individuals in a state of disequilibrium with con-
fusion and uncertainty about the kind of person they really 
are or feel they ought to be. In this regard, the successful 
resolution of the conflict of dissonance is clearly essential 
to ensure a state and a feeling of mental health. Interesting-
ly, Jung, Boss and other theorists argue that humankind in-
evitably is primarily guilty with existential guilt that 
perpetuates an eternal process of dilemma.9 In this way, 
the dissonance of guilt can be perceived to be a universal 
fundamental of the human condition. 
11 
(C) RELIGION AND DISSONANCE 
As a psychological term and entity, dissonance is fairly 
easily identifiable. It is a product and a process within 
the individual's modes of thinking and feeling. That these 
differ and are significantly shaped and affected by the religi-
ous worldview that the individual ascribes to, creates a 
more complex dimension for understanding the implications 
of the causes and consequences of dissonance for mental health. 
A particular religious conception establishes a set of norms 
and assumptions which sets up a network of cause and effect. 
That the Biblical Christian conception does so is shown in 
how this conception establishes and maintains notions of 
creatureliness, sin, sins, forgiveness, redemption and con-
science. The individual's memories, perceptions and expecta-
tions are influenced, to some degree, by the nature and impli-
cations of these notions as he or she accepts or rejects 
them and interacts with others who do likewise. 
When the Biblical conception of things, for example, is accept-
ed, states of dissonance can be established when the individual 
feels that they are sinners, not good enough, not sufficient-
ly Christ-like or any other evaluation in terms of the ideal 
of the conception. This is because the individual understands, 
in terms of this conception, that they are obliged to always 
compare their actions and thoughts with the ideals formulated 
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in the Biblical Christian conception. As a result, the indi-
vidual feels and believes they are obliged to live and behave 
in certain ways in relation to these conceptions. When these 
obligations are not met, the individual feels dissonance 
between the cognition of being a creature obliged to live 
according to the Will of the Creator God and the cognition 
of being a creature who has not lived according to the Will 
of the Creator God. 
Not all religions contain such an overt matrix of obligation. 
However, basic human needs to belong and to strive to fulfil 
ideals can be found in most systems of religion. Feelings 
of dissonance may therefore indeed be inevitable when indi-
viduals feel inadequate or unsure about their mode or degree 
of belonging and the fulfilment of ideals. In the Christian 
Biblical paradigm the conscience functions as a regulative 
mechanism to ensure and facilitate appropriate belonging 
and fulfilment. Other religions use other means for regulating 
their adherents' beliefs and behaviours. It would appear 
that these are, however, similar in purpose and function 
to those of the conscience.10 
The universality of the conscience is apparent in that the 
faculty of conscience has a role in the process and the feeling 
of dissonance and this feeling is a fundamental of the human 
condition. Consequently, as a significant entity which facili-
tates feelings of dissonance in the individual, the conscience 
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appears to be synonymous with states of dissonance in that 
both are negatively induced. They only have a function when 
things considered to be wrong are done and felt to contravene 
obligations to do right. 
The individual's conscience is that which regulates, initiates 
and decides upon feelings and particularly feelings of guilt. 
The conscience makes the individual feel guilty. It passes 
judgement on the individual in terms of their identity and 
their interaction and relationship to their environment. 
It does so by affecting cognitive and non-cognitive feelings. 
Thus 'feeling guilty about' means that there is a cognitive 
understanding of the action or thought in question, or there 
is quite simply the feeling itself. 
Three different functions of conscience are discernible within 
the concept conscience.11 Their differences are seen in 
terms of their definition, formation, and function and how 
their particular effects need to be dealt with in therapy. 
They are the BEING HUMAN CONSCIENCE, the SOCIALIZED CONSCIENCE 
and the PERSONAL CONSCIENCE. They share the primary role 
of the conscience, seeking good for the individual, and main-
taining the quest for inner harmony and equilibrium with 
the aim that the personality develops and functions 'normally' 
and maintains a state of mental health.12 Similarly, all 
three determine feelings of guilt, affect self-esteem and 
self image and the general behaviour of the individual. The 
14 
three have differing features nevertheless. These indicate 
how they function differentially within the conscience system. 
The BEING HUMAN CONSCIENCE ( BHC) is basically a preconscious 
mechanism, that 'automatically' gives the individual an aware-
ness of feeling 'bad' or 'guilty' and does not consciously 
refer to a system of morality or values. It is a faculty 
that expresses and experiences the pain, discomfort and dis-
sonance. Simply part of being human, it is that which some 
would argue as being 'God-given' and is something that appears 
to be intrinsically universal. Pierce (1958) describes the 
conscience as the capacity in man' s nature to react 'pain-
fully' .13 The Being 
and the feeling of 
Human Conscience is then the capacity 
conscience and invariably needs to be 
dealt with in therapy by bringing to consciousness the nature 
and reasons of guilty, bad and dissonant feelings. 
The capacity and feelings of conscience are qualitatively 
and quantitatively witnessed because of the SOCIALIZED CON-
SCIENCE (SC). This second 'kind' of conscience is a conscious 
one. It refers, albeit unconsciously oftentimes, to a system 
of preconscious morality because it seeks to refer the indi-
vidual to society, indicating how he or she has violated, 
breached or transgressed some specific moral standard. The 
conscience here is like a checklist or value system. It 
is a faculty of moral witness which reviews the individual. 
It does so in the particular terms of the society that has 
15 
produced this conscience in a particular process of socializa-
tion. 
The witness faculty of the SC witnesses qualitatively to 
produce a 'feeling' of 'good', 'bad' or 'weak' conscience. 
It also witnesses quantitatively to judge the situation and 
the acts and thoughts thereof. That is, the SC determines 
how the conscience, the capacity and faculty, 'feels' about 
its elf, its owner and his or her behaviour. In the case 
of a bad conscience, the SC will 'feel' to be without goodness, 
ineffective in controlling the individual's inadequacies, 
and reject honesty as a means of self-assessment. It would 
thus be part of a series of events contributing to the result 
of having this 'bad' conscience. 
A 'weak' conscience would be an SC manifested in situations 
where the individual had inadequate reference to knowledge 
of some or other morality or value system. It would be in-
effective, inoperative and indecisive. Conversely, a 'good' 
conscience would be an SC free from feelings of 'wrongness', 
pain and discomfort and aware of its admirable efforts at 
being good and without weakness and badness.14 
The SC judges 
terms of the 
refers to the 
these qualitative feelings quantitatively in 
approval-disapproval process. This process 
social value system to which the conscience 
is 'witnessing'. The process is one that works in conjunction 
16 
with the judgement the conscience knows it must pass. 
the process of approval-disapproval and judgement 
Together 
form the 
SC totality. Put another way, the SC is that which witnesses 
to the moral code that is written into the person's very 
nature by socio-religious processes. It judges the incidents 
when the code is breached, transgressed or violated, and 
does so within a given quality and range of intensity in 
emotional response, requiring the individual to obey the 
dictates of an internalized moral code or checklist. Dis-
obedience results in feelings of pain and discomfort when 
this aspect of conscience activates the individual's capacity 
to feel 'bad' about the violations. It therefore demands 
obedience through the 'symptoms' it produces which invariably 
can be causal factors in psychopathology .15 In therapy the 
effects of the SC thus need to be dealt with by ensuring 
the checklist and reactions to misdemeanours are reasonable 
and rational. 
The PERSONAL CONSCIENCE (PC) is that aspect of the conscience 
which derives from a personalized understanding of attitude 
and response to socio-religious codes and systems of morality. 
In distinction to the prescriptive, deductive function of 
the SC, the PC is inductive in its function. It is perhaps 
akin to what Buber ( 1965) termed the 'Higher Conscience' .16 
Buber argued that the 'Vulgar Conscience' only torments and 
harasses, whilst the 'Higher Conscience' sought the restoration 
and restitution of wrongs and that which was 'bad' .17 It 
17 
appears that in this way, the PC seeks the good of the indi-
vidual without merely only witnessing and judging as the 
SC does. Clearly this form of conscience is the ideal kind 
of conscience which is the goal of psychotherapy to instil 
in the individual. 
Within the SC, the RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE can be discerned. 
As it appears in the New Testament (NT) a particular 'kind' 
of this religious conscience function can be seen. The work 
of Pierce (1958) cogently explains the nature of this con-
science.18 This explanation is a theistic conception because 
Pierce works within a spiritual frame of reference. His 
account of conscience, and approach to it, differs from humani-
tarian, psychological approaches to the SC proper. Pierce 
argues that this conscience type as evident in the NT is 
not concerned with the future, and it witnesses both overt 
and covert behaviour.19 This type thus differs from the 
SC where only overt behaviour is 'judged' and the future 
is considered in terms of the possible consequences of vio-
lating actions and thoughts. 
Generally then, the conscience, as a faculty, works as a 
corrective and regulative agent. It does so according to 
certain aspects of 
as part of human 
its function. It 
nature ( the BHC), 
operates automatically 
with reference to its 
socialized conditioning, to form a weak good or bad socialized 








dynamics as exemplified by 
of consciences thus stand 
as predecessors, and almost as pre-requisites, for the Personal 
Conscience (PC), that highly individualized conscience that 
derives from the others and exemplifies the ideal conscience. 
Like drives, the conscience is one of the unobservables of 
the human condition. Basically a faculty within the individual 
which, as part of his or her nature, it functions as an expres-
sion of being human. It is activated automatically in relation 
to the individual's thoughts and actions; and this is particu-
larly so in regard to 'bad' thoughts and deeds. The conscience 
is thus basically concerned with specific past acts or thoughts 
that were 'wrong'. It therefore causes to come to conscious-
ness feelings of discomfort, pain and dissonance as the indi-
vidual, who, by act or thought, has begun or completed a 
transgression of some or other moral limit. This means that 
the individual has to consciously deal with feelings that 
result whether they be pleasant or unpleasant with the know-
ledge that unpleasant ones can develop psychopathological 
implications for personality development and functioning. 
The role of the conscience is thus a primary one in the 
development and functioning of the individual personality. 
It therefore plays an important role in the maintenance of 
mental health because it determines, inter alia, guilt feelings 
and self-esteem evaluations. These two particular complexes 
19 
powerfully affect intrapersonal relationships. In turn, 
the socialized subjective aspect of the conscience influences 
the social development and social functioning of the person-
ality in interpersonal relationships. It does so by control-
ling impulses for transitory or opportunistic achievements. 
This is in deference to more long term goals and consistency 
with the kind of person that the individual really wants 
to be. 
In essence then, the conscience is dynamically related to 
the individual's self-image, feelings of self-esteem, long-term 
goals and feelings of guilt. This is because it functions 
as a kind of moral witness in the individual's inner world. 
I t experiences and induces discomfort, dissonance and conflict 
which occurs when thoughts and actions, resulting from the 
outcomes of drives, are at variance with standards and values 
that have been internalized as part of the individual's person-
ality. Thus, conscience not only inflicts feelings of dis-
comfort, it is known in the discomforter, and is therefore 
sometimes spoken of as though it feels the discomfort itself. 
In terms of the therapeutic situation, it is probably better 
to emphasize it as witness in order to indicate detachment. 
The detachment is necessary so that a way of dealing with 
psychic discomfort is assured. 
Clearly the conscience functions on the basis of self-knowledge 
of the individual's own identity and social relationships. 
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If this self-knowledge or identity itself is inadequate, 
underdeveloped or warped in any way, the conscience, although 
perhaps operative, will be similarly affected. Irrespective 
of this, however, the conscience. is the realm of feelings 
attached to ongoing conflict between drives and goals and 
the results of needs. Essentially the conscience ought to 
be seen as that which establishes, maintains and is the dis-
sonant guilt feelings of the individual, irrespective of 
the level or kind of the conscience that is operating, and 
works as a psychological mechanism shaped by religious factors 
inherent in ethical and moral codes and systems of human 
behaviour.20 
The conscience and feelings of dissacilitate positive and 
negative outcomes. Thice that s facilitation is in effect 
their purpose. The outcomes are, however, primarily determined 
by the distressful, uncomfortable inner environment conditions 
that demand attention. Attention invariably means seeking 
resolution of conflicting issues and this involves an examina-
tion of the grounds of conflict. This refers the individual 
to their self-concept, belief system and philosophical posi-
tion. 
Thus, for example, the individual who acknowledges or accepts 
his or her creatureliness, and the implications of this status 
as formulated in the Biblical conception, ascribes to the 
notion of obligation. Obligation is a primary dynamic in 
21 
the initiation of feelings of dissonance. Dissonance occurs 
when the individual, as a creature, feels obliged to behave 
and think according to the will, plan and purposes of the 
Creator and has not done so. In the Biblical Christian reli-
gious conception, a particular lifestyle has been formulated 
to accord with the paradigm of life it espouses. Inherent 
obligation is one of its features. When life is not lived 
according to this paradigm, dissonance results if individuals 
cannot reconcile expectation with -fulfilment, with direct 
and indirect consequences on the way they function in reference 
to this conception. 
viduals feel about 
A fundamental consequence is what indi-
themselves.21 The different responses 
to temptation give some clear illustrations in this regard. 
When temptation to breach or transgress a norm, and not to 
fulfil an obligation thereby is resisted, feelings of relief 
and self-congratulation result.22 When the temptation is 
resisted, feelings of hostility, envy, depression and regret 
could also be directed by the person towards themself because 
indulgence would have given pleasure. In this second instance, 
the conflict of interests between different cognitions causes 
dissonance. 
These conflicts of interest can lead to a third situation 
wherein self-worth, lifestyle and authenticity are questioned 
in relation to what is believed and partially accepted as 
'right.' Such conflicts are evident in disorders like ego 
22 
dystonic homosexuality and other less complex dyads of dis-
cordant cognitions. In these dyads, the person does not 
want to accept a certain constellation of feelings and earnest-
ly seeks another. 23 The contrary drives and consequent dis-
crepant obligations create cognitive and/or psychodynamic 
dissonance that is debilitating. 
These three different responses indicate the integral role 
self-concept and self-interest have in the initiation and 
implications of dissonance and the condition it creates for 
mental heal th. The cognitive and punitive consequences of 
yielding to temptation and thereby not fulfilling obligations 
are crucially linked to the individual's options for reducing 
dissonance and restoring emotional and cognitive equilibrium. 
Wright (1983) differentiates between cognitive and punitive 
consequences. 24 The former consists of four possibilities. 
These are: a revision of the self-concept; the self being 
seen as an instrument and therefore not personally responsible; 
the yielding to temptation is excused or dismissed as un-
important, or, self-critical and self-blaming thoughts. 
tive consequences arise out of this last cognitive 




'pay' for the misdemeanour, make reparation, apologise or 
confess.25 
These consequences all reflect varying degrees of dissonance 
which initiate different outcomes. They all seek to restore 
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and ensure cognitive consistency and emotional equilibrium. 
When the consequences of dissonance become a condition of 
disequilibrium, they can seriously affect mental health. 
Clearly various cognitive, psychological strategies can reduce 
cognitive dissonance. These strategies in effect make up 
the deficit of the missing obligation and restore the indi-
vidual to subsequently fulfil appropriate, expected, obligatory 
conditions at a cognitive level. Any psychodynamic implica-
tions are not necessarily considered. Although cognitive 
consonance may be re-established, psychodynamic dissonance 
can continue to affect mental health, when obligatory condi-
tions are not wholly felt to have been met.26 
Paul Ricoeur ( 1969) describes the notion of obligation and 
its possible consequences in this way:27 
••• if I feel, or believe, or know, that I am obli-
gated, it is because I am · a being that can act, 
not only under the impulsion or constraint of desire 
and fear, but under the condition of a law which 
I represent to myself to act according to the 
representation of a law is something other than 
to act according to laws. This power of acting 
according to the representation of a law is the 
will. But this discovery has long-range consequen-
ces: for in discovering the power to follow the 
law (or that which I consider as the law for myself) 
I discover also the terrible power of acting against 
Indeed the experience of remorse which is the ex-
perience of the relation between freedom and obliga-
tion is a twofold experience; on the one hand 
I recognise an obligation, and therefore a power 
corresponding to this obligation, but I admit to 
having acted against the law which continues to 
appear to me as obligatory. This is commonly called 
a transgression. 
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I n this extract, Ricoeur shows how obligation occurs and 
what its implications are. He points out the legally and 
morally binding nature of the understanding the individual 
has about his or herself and how he or she has to, or ought 
to, behave if the penalty of transgression is to be avoided. 
Thus, as is evident in the Christian Biblical conception, 
individuals understand that they 
legally and morally to behave 
are, as creatures, obligated 
accordingly. If not, they 
face the consequences of contravening the will of the Creator 
God. These consequences involve the penalty conceptualized 
and formalized in sin and sins.28 
In addition, Ricoeur identifies the role of freedom in this 






and fall of 
going against the demands of the obligation 
integral to the creature-Creator relationship. 
Ricoeur refers to the example of the choice 
Adam, dissonance is 
so much a part of 
usefully illustrating 
this paradigm and how 
how 
it is inevitably 
experienced in the processes of all decision-making and evalu-
ation of decisions for those within the Biblical paradigm. 
Thus Ricoeur shows how the awareness that one not only could 
have done otherwise, but in fact ought to have done so, can 
be responsible' for feelings of dissonance because the indi-
vidual invariably feels uncomfortable about a range of things, 
which are particularized in terms of contravening obligations. 
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That is, the individual, by acknowledging contravention or 
that an obligation has not been met, accepts the reality 
of the misdemeanour and the consequences of it. This accept-
ance invariably constitutes a cognition which may be incon-
sistent with other cognitions the individual may hold. In 
effect this may mean that the individual realizes or acknowled-
ges that they are not quite the kind of person they ought 
or wish to be. 
This matrix of obligation can develop into a situation where 
individuals live according to what they believe others expect 
of them. They are therefore not true to themselves and who 
they really are and live inauthentic, fabricated lives as 
a result.29 As such, they are constantly at war with them-
selves. Such states of dissonance can occur in the cognitive 
and psychodynamic spheres because the two kinds of person 
compete for expression but are in conflict due to their op-
posing natures. Career mothers, recovering alcoholics and 
ego dystonic homosexuals are examples of persons with such 
dyads of inner conflict.30 
The experience of such inconsistency and conflict within 
the inner environment of the person results when cognitions 
of personhood are antithetical. The antithesis can be with 
r eference to an incident, episode or entire personality. 
I n each, the feelings of dissonance which the discrepancies 
i nitiate are similar to the feelings of discomfort ascribed 
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to the workings of the conscience. This is because these 
feelings in the inner environment are the result of conflicting 
cognitions or conceptions. 
Any disclosure of dissonance or conscience is obviously only 
a part of a larger cognition that relates to the totality 
of the individual because conflict and inconsistency result 
when some aspect of the totality seriously undermines or 
questions the totality and integrity of the whole. When 
the coherency of the self is thus felt to be threatened and 
its obligations to itself, others and religion are in a state 
of disarray and confusion, some form of dissonance results. 
This is due to the individual evaluating memories, perceptions 
and expectations negatively in that they are considered to 
have been inappropriate, wrong or unethical. 
Codes of ethics in fact play an important role in determining 
particular lifestyles.31 Ethics are sets of moral principles 
which individuals relate to. They are not necessarily ani-
thetically biased towards other religious or psychological 
formulations. As codes of behaviour, they establish points 
of reference to which the individual can evaluate him or 
herself.32 The outcome of this evaluation can manifest feel-
ings of discomfort and disappointment and be realized as 
feelings of dissonance. These are the result of the evaluation 
mechanism, the conscience, evaluating and judging the perform-
ance of the individual vis-a-vis ethical obligations that 
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have not been met. When they are met, consonance results 
as does a clear, 'good' conscience. 
Christian Ethics, or Moral Theology, seeks to explore and 
explain the rights and wrongs of life, and to argue for certain 
behaviours, thoughts, modes of action and lifestyles that 
will ensure consonance.33 Thereby, a code for appropriate 
right and ethical Christian behaviour is established. This 
code, and indeed the ethical codes of all religions, function 
in terms of the demand and response of ethical obligations.34 
David Chidester (1987) has shown there are four possible 
kinds of response to the demands of such formulations of 
ethical obligations.35 He argues that each represents the 
basic condition of possibility for the individual's response 
to obligations in any system of religious ethics. These 
are: Morality - in which what ought to be done is done because 
the individual wants to do it; Discipline - in which what 
ought to be done is done because the individual feels it 
has to be done; Antinomianism in which the individual 
does what they want to because there are no ethical laws 
to be observed; Improvisation in which the individual 
does what they want to by creatively responding to ethical 
situations that enable this. 
Each indicates the concomitant possibility of dissonance 
that occurs when the individual, despite doing what was felt, 
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ought or wanted to be done, still feels the response was 
inconsistent with other cognitions. This is because, as 
Chidester explains, "the normative images of obligation may 
be in conflict with actual behaviour, 
interests. 11 36 That is, the individual's 




with cognitions of the normative and expected. This results 
in a conflict between what the individual was apparently 
obliged to do and feel and what is actually done and felt. 
In his book The Psychology of Religion, Robert Thouless (1971) 
has a chapter, 'The Moral Conflict. ' 3 7 In it he explores 
the consequences of yielding to temptation and not fulfilling 
one's obligations. He states moral conflict within the indi-
vidual is a direct result of conflict generated in the breach 
between "behaviour tendencies and an opposing system of 
requirements of which he recognises the authority. 11 38 
The system of requirements Thouless refers to are the ethical 
codes and systems of morality that religions formulate in 
obligations. In this sense it is interesting to note that 
Thouless concludes: "the tendency of the experience of the 
moral conflict is to produce one of the roots of the reli-
gious attitude. 11 39 This substantiates the view that dissonance 
fuels and fires religions. It does so by facilitating self-
evaluations cognizant of the self as something accountable 
to a paradigm of ideal selfhood. Thus dissonance, and feelings 
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of guilt in particular, relate to morality, socio-religious 
controls and systems of ethical obligations. This is because 
the individual experiences conflict between cognitions of 
the norm and expected and cognitions of him or herself. This 
conflict is reminiscent of Nietzsche's argument, in On the 
Genealogy of Morals {1969),40 that legal obligations were 
the antecendants of moral ethical obligations. 
Chidester { 1987) argues that there is a twofold dynamic in-
herent in the experience of ethical dissonance arising out 
of the implications of ethical obligations. One dynamic 
is the dissonance caused by failures to meet expectations 
embodied in some ethical obligation. The other is the forma-
tion of ethical obligations by religious traditions seeking 
to ensure response to situations of dissonance. These dynamics 
together form the dissonance experience in a circular symbiosis 
that necessitates and requires the other. This is because, 
as Chidester points out, "normative patterns of obligation 
both create dissonance and hold the potential for resolving 
that dissonance in a pattern of ethical harmony."41 
Consequently, moral harmony, the outcome of ethical harmony, 
in religious ethics at any rate, "is an attunement between 
desires and obligation" because desires are "shaped, ordered, 
and harmonized" in their confrontation with obligations. 
They are also "frustrated, confused and (made) ambiguous n42 
by them. The result is that desires, that which has been 
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identified as drives, are basic to the individual human 
condition as the individual encounters and lives in the worlds 
of inner and outer experience. These encounters and their 
manifestations produce the history of religions when right 
and moral become apparent obligatory absolutes which 
individuals accept or reject and experience the consequences 
of their choices. Dissonance and the workings of the 
conscience are thus integral constituents of this process 
and its outcomes. 
In short, dissonance is caused when the individual realizes 
and is troubled by conflicting cognitions either of a psycho-
logical or religious nature. In both cases, they ply indi-
viduals with questions about the kind of person they really 
are, disrupting harmony of selfhood and thereby affecting 
personality functioning and mental health.43 
1.2 
TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS DISSONANCE 
Irrespective of the types of dissonance and its particular 
causal attributes, the nature of dissonance experienced in-
variably involves and consists of one of the basic emotions 
of subjective experience.44 Guilt, shame, fear, anxiety, 
and anger are some of the principal emotions in this regard. 
It would appear that shame and guilt are actually the two 
most basic emotions of dissonance because all others seem 
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to rely on them to some extent.45 
Differences in the type of dissonance experienced in the 
condition of feeling guilty and the feeling of a sense of 
shame has been a significant issue for those involved in 
this area in the Social Sciences. There have been numerous 
attempts to compare and contrast the two. The work of David 
Ausubel (1955), Helen Block Lewis (1972), Ruth Benedict (1946), 
Piers and Singer (1971) and Thrane (1979), are especially 
significant.46 
According to Ausubel, shame and guilt, al though "distinguish-
able from one another, are nevertheless neither dichotomous 
nor mutually exclusive." He argues, guilt "may be conceptual-
ized as a special kind of negative evaluation which occurs 
when an individual acknowledges that his behaviour is at 
variance with a given moral value to which he feels obligated 
to conform" and as such "is a self-reaction to an injured 
conscience, if by conscience is meant an abstraction referring 
to a feeling of obligation_ to abide by all internalized moral 
values. The injury consists _of a self-perceived violation 
of this obligation •. " Shame however, is, according to Ausubel, 
"An unpleasant emotional reaction by an individual to an 
actual or presumed negative judgment of himself by others 
resulting in self-deprication vis-a-vis the group. 11 47 
For Ausubel the condition of shame can consist of either 
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non-moral shame or moral shame. The former is the embarrass-
ment resulting from "committing a breach of propriety, or, 
having one's bodily intimacy exposed to public scrutiny, 
and, 'loss of face' resulting from exposure of ignorance 
or incompetency," while the latter is "a reaction to the 
negative moral judgments of others. n48 Ausubel also shows 
how moral shame has two different aspects. The first is 
internalized moral shame. This is when shame results from 
presumed or fantasied reproach. The other, non-internalized 
moral shame, results when an individual reacts with self-
deprication to the moral condemnation of others but does 
not accept the moral value to which they had failed to conform. 
Therefore Ausubel contends, "shame is only 
of guilt the component involving external 
one component 
judgment and 
sanction is only 
one of the 
and, conversely, the shame of guilt 
many kinds of shame." This is because 
external sanctions alone. Guilt relies 
"Shame 





external sanctions. 11 49 
shame and guilt can be 
Accordingly, Ausubel 
more effectively and 
accurately distinguished in terms of 
tions. There are, he posits, two 
ethnocentric considera-
possibilities. One is 
from the 
in the 
superego models of guilt, which are those evident 
Freudian conception of personality functioning and 
of dissonance. The other is from the view of guilt causes 
being seen as a "Shameless, wholly internalized conviction 
of sin. nSO This is obviously that conception which is the 
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result of the Biblical Christian paradigm.51 
Thus Ausubel argues there are three psychological conditions 
necessary for the development of guilt behaviour. One is 
that a code of moral values is acknowledged and accepted. 
The second is that a sense of moral obligation to abide by 
these values is internalized. Finally, sufficient self-
critical ability is required in order that discrepancies 
between internalized values and actual behaviour are perceived. 
These perceptions would thus initiate the feelings of dis-
sonance and activate the conscience. This activation would 
result in feelings of guilt when this was an appropriate 
response to the dissonance and the discrepancies.52 
Helen Block Lewis (1972) has also expounded upon the dif-
ferences between shame and guilt. She critically discusses 
them in a chapter entitled Shame in Depression and Hysteria.53 
Lewis looks at shame and guilt phenomenologically so as to 
examine the sequences of these two 'superego states' and 
how they lead to different paths of symptom formation. This 
is because, Lewis asserts, symptom formation occurs when 
guilt and shame together cannot be distinguished in the feeling 
nexus of the 'confused' individual. 
Lewis thus shows how 
cognitive functioning 
mode of functioning. 
the individual's style of perceptual-
is one determinant in the superego's 
Accordingly, she distinguishes between 
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what she terms field dependent and field independent styles 
of functioning. 54 Shame is seen as a greater force in the 
superego of the field dependent patients and guilt as a greater 
force in the superego of field independent patients. 
In this way, Lewis shows how guilt, although related to shame, 
has different causes and consequences. She asserts that 
guilt and shame are different regarding three aspects of 
human functioning. That is, whereas guilt increases cognitive 
processes, shame inhibits them; guilt renders the self more 
active whilst shame induces passivity; and guilt leads to 
isolation and rationalization, when shame leads to denial 
and repression. These manifest as thought disorders of ob-
session and paranoia for guilt and affective disorders such 
as depression for shame. That the two emotions and their 
consequences invariably overlap and are very similar is of 
course contingent on specific personality and contextual 
factors. Lewis' 'Summary of Working Concept for Shame and 
Guilt' is presented in Appendix A. 
Chidester ( 1987) also differentiates between shame and guilt 
in terms of their specific natures that effect them as dis-
sonance networks. His conclusions are presented below in 
point form in order to summarize their essential features 
vis-a-vis their ethical import. According to Chidester then, 
shame: 
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arises in ethical context that is structured by 
religious distinctions between purity and defilement 
is an inner sense of being defiled, polluted, taint-
ed, or stained by violating the ethical boundaries 
that are established within a religious community 
is a public embarrassment, chagrin, or distress 
caused by violating the ethical order ••• 
is deeply embedded in religious symbolism of impurity 
emerges as an ethical defilement within the context 
of an ethical order marked out by taboos ••• 
whereas guilt 
is an experience of ethical liability ••• 
is an ethical indebtedness before the tribunal 
of divine judgment ••• 
is a sense of basic unworthiness before the demands 
of obligation ••• 
a private experience of 
a failure to fulfil the 
of religious ethics ••• 
dissonance resulting from 
expectations of a system 
emerges from ethical judgment that accuses, convicts 
and condemns people of their sinfulness by missing 
the mark set by ethical obligation ••• 55 
This differentiation indicates that there are different levels, 
in terms of quality and quantity, of dissonance and its ethical 
delimitations. The implications and strengths of drives 
and desires intimated that this would be so. This is because 
the amount of self-interest and self-threatening attributes 
the cognitions consist of in relation to ethical considerations 
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determines their possible effects. Some cognitions will 
naturally be more dangerous and debilitating than others. 
In addition, some may only be thoughts that never refer to 
or are realized in action contrary to ethical obligations. 
Distinction can be made between dissonant acts and dissonant 
desires. This has been confirmed by Chidester. He states: 
II dissonant actions reveal more fundamental desires that 
are not in harmony with obligation II and dissonant desires 
are dispositions that cause conflict and disharmony.56 There 
is a difference of opinion about determining culpability 
of desires as opposed to acts. Human codes of thought 
and behaviour are to a certain extent arbitrary. Inevitably, 
codes are responsible for shaping the perceptions, cognitions, 
memories and expectations of those who ascribe to them. In 
addition, ethical codes constitute hierarchies of norms and 
values. Thus their contravention, in thought or in deed, 
has varying levels of affect on those who are influenced 
by or through them, and, in certain cases, thoughts and desires 
are just as debilitating as the acts they may or may not 
produce. 
Moreover, contravening acts, if considered sinful, are seen 
as specific violations and 
determined ethical norms of 
transgressions of 
behaviour. Actions 
do express the 
are disclosures 
inner nature of the 








to the person. If acts disclose a disposition that is in 
conflict with the norm and that which is expected, desires 










The dissonance of guilt feelings, whether due to acts or 
desires initiates a sense of inertia, of being seized, and 
overpowered by the emotion of feeling guilty. As such, the 
emotion of feeling guilty envelopes all feelings, instincts, 
reasons and sensations into one for a period of time and 
totally occupies the individual's inner environment.SB 
There is a danger, however, in viewing 'guilt' 
is not 
too simplis-
tically in this regard. 
entity or condition. This 
the term 'feeling guilty' 







encompasses a host of personalized 
cannot be assumed that the one 
word all inclusively describes a paradigmatic stability of 
feelings and a condition of the inner environment. Never-
theless, this inner environment of guilt has particular recog-
nizable effects at a conscious level of the personality and 
are distinguishable from theose of shame as shown by the 
theorists above. The guilt feelings are the specific constel-
lation of feelings that the individual 'has'. They affect 
the individual's thought processes and invariably are reflected 
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in behaviour. Basically the individual feels incomplete, 
miserable and worthless and these feelings mitigate against 
more appropriate and effective attitudes and feelings for 
optimal personality functioning. 
The condition of feeling guilty results in one, all or any 
combination of the following cognitions in which guilt feelings 
cause and maintain a certain mental and emotional state of 
dissonance.59 They 
1.3 
lower or even destroy the individual's self-confidence 
and self-esteem 
make the individual feel 
because some sense of a 
been lost 
depressed, hollow and empty 
firm ground of identity has 
make the individual feel unloved and unlovable 
destroy any previous feelings of contentment and peace-
with-the-world 
seek to justify and increase the individual's feelings 
of anger and resentment about the inadequacy or fault 
that caused the wrong 
generally make the individual feel under attack, alone, 
vulnerable and separated from others.GO 
DEALING WITH DISSONANCE 
Attempts to deal with the state of dissonance have been formu-
lated because dissonance is an area of concern for psycholo-
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gists and religionists who wish to improve the human situation. 
Both discourses seek to control dissonance and its effects 
in order to facilitate mental health and thereby justify 
their own ends. Both view states of consonance within the 
individual as the ideal. In this regard it is interesting 
that, as Chidester noted, "the potential for achieving moral 
harmony is reinforced in religious traditions through specific 
practical strategies for harmonizing . actions and desires. n 61 
Such a view confirms the contention that the role of religion 
in controlling dissonance or effecting it to precipitate 
harmony is one of its major functions. Psychology has 
explicitly questioned and challenged this role and its outcomes 
and has offered the world its own permutated methods for 
attaining mental health.62 
The practical strategies of religions for controlling dis-
sonance have been looked at encyclopaedically by John T McNeill 
in his book A History of the Cure of Souls ( 1977) .63 He 
concludes that humankind always seeks health of the person-
ality: "the well-being of the soul." 64 McNeill explains 
that the opposite, what may now be identified as dissonance 
and the workings of the conscience, are the "painful disorders 
of mind and spirit" which do not give a sense of health. 
This is because, McNeill asserts, "for the attainment of 
full health of personality, man must find a harmonious 
relationship in the realm of spiritual values." 6 5 In such 
a harmonious relationship, dissonance and a troubling 
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conscience would not occur. 
This is because the word 'harmony' is the antithesis of dis-
harmony, a cognate of the concept dissonance. McNeill points 
out, within the Biblical conception of things, that the primary 
obstacle to the realm of consonance and harmony is what the 
"Bible calls sin." He also explains the role and function 
the conscience has in the process of ensuring such a state 
of consonance prevails. In addition, McNeill asserts, the 
conscience ensures there is a sense of guilt when its dictates 
are violated.66 For McNeil!, conscience is conceived as 
tied and related to feelings of dissonance. It is activated 
by them and activates them in turn as part of its function. 
This is because, the conscience is, feels, and recognises 
the pains of the discomfort either at a cognitive, or, at 
a psychodynamic level, when two conflicting discrepancies 
are causing disharmony in the inner environment of the indi-
vidual. 
McNeill thus concludes that in dealing with dissonance, the 
voice of conscience has a vital role to play. This is because 
it is seen as that which, firstly, enables the person to 
recognise faults and defects in the fulfilment of obligations. 
Secondly, it points to the actualities of sin when this is 
a concept to which the individual ascribes and incorporates. 
Prayer, work and recreative pursuits are three everyday activi-
ties which McNeill argues are the means for building stronger 
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senses of Christian identity which would contend with feelings 
of needless dissonance. 
Other means of dealing with dissonance and pangs of conscience 
in the Christian Religion are those of redemption, salvation 
and forgiveness as formulated from the Gospel of Jesus Christ. 
Forgiveness of sin and acceptance of all are offered as oppor-
tunities for real change, growth and maturity. A virtual 
obligatory demand to change to this new Christian self, that 
would leave out the dissonance-causing feelings, desires 
and lifestyle, are clearly strategies for dealing with dis-
sonance. 
In these restorative processes, the reasons and the levels 
of and for dissonance are reduced. They are replaced with 
a commitment and a more healthy concern with and for the 
lifestyle of Christian living. This lifestyle more fully 
meets and recognises its creaturely obligations to the Creator 
God as well as to the self, as a creature, and others. Doing 
so reduces the influence, effect and feelings of dissonance 
of contrary cognitions. 
The actual meaning of these Christian concepts and what their 
processes and outcomes really mean for mental heal th is a 
matter of contention. However, the extent that restorative 
processes also occur in other religions, and is the task 
of psychotherapy, demands that all the strategies for dealing 
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with dissonance be accounted for. This is so that dealing 
with dissonance can be done as effectively as possible. 
Proposals to this end are presented in Chapter Four. 
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CONCWSION 
Dissonance is a fundamental aspect of much mental activity. 
It has its source in conceptions of self-hood that conflict 
with conceptions of what the person could, should, 
to be. These conceptions have basically been the 
or wants 
product 
of religions and other ideologies which seek 
and ensure their particular paradigm of the 
to perpetuate 
ideal. That 
these establish cognitions which individuals compare themselves 
to, can lead to cognitive and non-cognitive forms of dis-
sonance. 
Psychology has tried to explain how dissonance occurs at 
these cognitive and non-cognitive levels and has also said 
that religion causes much of it. The two realms of discourse 
thus of ten work against each other. Nevertheless, the two 
agree on the nature and the dangers of dissonance and the 
need to deal with it to bring about the consonance and harmony 
synonymous with mental health. This consonance, they agree, 
is essentially possible by bringing the contents of dissonant 
cognitions and psychic dynamics to conscious, cognitive levels. 
The importance of being able to deal with dissonance at the 
cognitive levels is that it is only at this level that it 
can be effectively dealt with. Otherwise it remains at the 
level of affect. Here the dangers of irrationality and ob-
scurity can debilitate against more appropriate mental and 
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emotional functioning. The result of this kind of malfunction-
ing is that the self-concept of the individual can be impaired 
and coping strategies inhibited. Such debilitating psycho-
logical consequences can be related to the individual's reli-
gious predelictions. The most important dynamic here is 
that of ethical obligation. This dynamic causes the individual 
to think and behave in certain ways, with contraventions 
and deviations resulting in disharmony and dissonance in 
the inner environment and this needs to be realized in the 
therapeutic situation. 
Strategies for dealing with debilitating or dangerous levels 
or kinds of disharmony and dissonance have been evolved by 
religions and by psychology indicating that they share a 
task in the field of the care and cure of the human condition. 
Unfortunately, one discourse can inhibit the healing process 
when employed inappropriately by the other, when the persons 
involved in receiving or giving the therapy are not aware 
of the negative and positive elements in both realms of dis-
course. This means that the language used to communicate 
about the condition and its subsequent feelings, needs to 
be a familiar one to all persons, if the situation is to 
be properly addressed. 
It is in this regard that a need for a common language is 
evidently not only required but necessary. 
the two abound in terms of their means 
Differences between 
and methods. But, 
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the two are concerned with the same end, al though somewhat 
differently. This is because psychological discourse seeks 
to restore consonance by ensuring and bringing about wholeness, 
integrity and authenticity in the mental health of the indi-
vidual. Religions appear to seek this too, but add their 
particular ideological ideal of an appropriate individual 
and way of living. 
Before presenting a response to the need for a common language 
for dealing with dissonance, further exposition of psycho-
logical and religious realms of discourse about individual 
functioning is necessary. Accordingly, the following two 
chapters present Freud's theory of personality functioning 
and the Christian Biblical conception of the individual res-
pectively, as paradigmatic statements from each realm that 
are essential for clarifying the relationship between dis-
sonance, psychology and religion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FREUD'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY FUNCTIONING 
For the purposes of this thesis a foothold in psychological 
discourse about personality functioning is needed because 
a general theory of how persons function was seen as helpful 
in setting out an exposition of a particular aspect and process 
of this functioning. The psychodynamic theory of personality 
functioning by Sigmund Freud has been chosen for this foothold 
for reasons of its centrality, consistency and suitability 
for any analysis of the dissonance of guilt. 
Firstly, Freud's theory is a major one in any terms. Practi-
cally speaking, all psychologists either work within the 
basics 
a way 
of his theory, or 
that purposefully 
in some modification of it, or in 
seeks to work differently to it. 
It is thus a central theory. Secondly, the theory is a holis-
tic and relatively consistent one, if a 'final theory' is 
abstracted from the process of Freud's works and the develop-
ment of his ideas. Thirdly, Freud's model is particularly 
well suited to our focus of concern. That is, the condition 
of feeling guilty particularly lends itself to examination 
in terms of what the id, 
inner environment of the 
its 'home.' 
ego and supergo are and do in the 
individual, where guilt too has 
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This presentation of Freud's ideas is not intended to be 
definitive. Critics and exponents of Freud abound. It seems 
that there are as many 'Freuds' as there are books about 
him and his ideas. 1 Arriving at the truth about Freud is 
the task of psychology, not this thesis. Our task is to 
use our understanding of his theory to formulate some con-
clusions regarding our concern. This is because, after all, 
Freud is perhaps saying nothing new about the human condition. 
He nevertheless introduced and mapped out an easier, more 
systematic theory that can be used to reach new and better 
conclusions. 
This chapter will be in three parts. The first presents 
our understanding of Freud's model, explaining its structural 
parts. The second explains the dynamics of the theory and 
the third assesses its implications for the analysis of the 
dissonance of guilt. 
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2.1 
FREUD'S THEORY OF MENTAL AND PERSONALITY FUNCTIONING: ITS 
STRUCTURAL PARTS 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) presented humankind with a way 
of trying to understand itself. His ideas about the theory 
of personality, his psychoanalytical theory of neurosis, 
and the techniques of psychoanalysis he proposed, are mile-
stones in the history of ideas. Moreover, they continue 
to function as cornerstones in the social sciences, arts 
and humanities of today. This is because Freud presents 
a systematic and relatively consistent theory of the mental 
processes of humankind that seem to be responsible for 'be-
haviour.' In addition, the theory contains concepts and 
terms which usefully identify and label specific aspects 
of these processes. 
In the preface to his book Freud, Richard Wollheim (1983)2 
succinctly comments on the revolutionary power of Freud's 
writings and speculations. Wollheim writes: 
" Sigmund Freud, by the power of his writings and 
by the breadth and audacity of his speculations, revo-
lutionized the thought, the lives and the imagination 
of an age. He contradicted, and in some cases he rever-
sed, the prevailing opinions on many of the issues 
of human existence and culture. He led people to think 
about their appetites and their intellectual powers, 
about self-knowledge and self-deceit, about the ends 
of life and about man's profoundest passions and about 
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his most intimate or trivial failings, in ways that 
would have seemed to earlier generations at once scan-
dalous and silly. IT WOULD BE HARD TO FIND IN THE HISTORY 
OF IDEAS, EVEN IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION, SOMEONE WHOSE 
INFLUENCE WAS SO IMMEDIATE, SO BROAD AND SO DEEP." 
(our capitals) 
Freud's thoughts all-pervasively explore the complexity 
of the 'behaviour' of the human mind. He sought to 
explain the mechanisms of mental life so the compli-
cated sequences of human thought, behaviour and feeling 
could be more scientifically understood. This 'scien-
tific' quest is apparent in what Freud himself said: 
"Two aims plague me: to see how the theory of 
mental functions would shape itself if one introduced 
quantitative considerations, a sort of economics 
of nervous energy; and, secondly, to extract what 
psychopathology has to yield for normal psychology. 11 3 
Freud's account of the mind is one developed out of two reali-
zations he had about human experience. One was the 'fact' 
of inf anti le sexuality. It was this 'fact' that led Freud 
to be able to explain so much of the subsequent psychosexual 
development of the individual. This was because he was able 
to trace trajectories of infantile experience in its confronta-
tions with its external environment in 'problematic' feelings 
and activities evident in case-studies of children and adults. 
Such later problems were, Freud argued, the direct results 
of problems in infantile or earlier stages of development. 
so 
The second 'fact' was that repression of desires, sexual 
ones for example, did not negate 
desire. It was merely put into 
continued, albeit without the 
or remove the power of the 
the 'System ucs' 4 where it 
individual's awareness, to 
exert itself. In recognising this, Freud postulated that 
the System UCS (unconscious) consisted of all that was re-
pressed and contained instinctual representations of drives 
and autonomic systems. From this conclusion Freud postulated 
the concept of the ego. This essentially was the repressing 
forces. These forces operated unconsciously, although the 
ego was basically a conscious entity. This was because, 
as Freud explained, the ego can be seen as the basic sense 
of identity. Clearly the ego worked to repress drives that 
could or did give rise to feelings of dissonance. 
For Freud, personality was the composite result of the inter-
activity of this unconscious level and the conscious level. 
The individual personality was a particular conglomeration 
of instincts, desires and behaviours which originated in 
a particular developmental process. This process produced 
the psychological being. But, as Freud explains, there· was 
inevitably considerable tension and subsequent dissonance 
between instinctual, primitive urges and needs of the 'bio-
logical being' which socialized civilized obligations and 
conventions do not permit. Freud argues that neurotic be-
haviour results when the psychological being cannot manage 
the tension or the dissonance effectively. 
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This is because, Freud posits, all acts of the individual, 
including perceptions, sensations, emotions, habits, attitudes, 
thoughts, memories, ideas, and inner conflicts in these, 
have to be dealt with by the psychological 'function' of 
the individual. These psychological functions are: repression 
to the unconscious level; conformity to social/group/familial 
standards; use of defence mechanisms such as compensation, 
intellectualization, sublimation, etc.; and 
of feelings of inferiority, guilt and other 
self-devaluing behaviours.5 These functions 
the production 
' unhealthy' and 
all ensure the 
individual functions in response to the environment. Some 
responses constitute debilitating functions with psychopatho-
logical possibilities when the functions are inappropriate 
or inadequate. 
Freud postulated that these psychological functions indicated 
that the personality consists of three major 'systems. ' He 
showed how they function and .what they consist of in Lec-
ture 31, entitled "The Dissection of the Psychical person-
ality."6 This lecture material derives from his earlier 
work in The Ego and the Id ( 1923). 7 The three systems are 
called id, ego and superego. The formulation of them forms 
Freud's structural theory of the mind which was a new synthesis 
of his previously formulated topographical division of the 
mind into preconscious, conscious and unconscious.a 
This previous topographical theory had been based on the 
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criterion of accessibility to consciousness. The 'new' struc-
tural theory retained the fundamental distinction of levels 
of consciousness. In it, the id was named as the unconscious 
instinctual agent, whilst the partially conscious ego and 
superego were seen as the mediating, regulating agent and 
moral derivative of the ego respectively. The features, 
functions, origins and energy-sources of these three entities 
Freud conceived as theoretical constructs of the personality, 
usefully explain how psychodynamic dissonance originates 
and how guilt feelings can be brought about. (A Summary 
Table of the features and implications of the id, ego and 
superego is presented in Appendix B.) 
The id is described, somewhat colloquially, by Freud as: 
" the dark, inaccessible part of our personality 
a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitation 
filled with energy reaching it from the instincts 
has no organization ••• knows no judgements of value: 
. . • Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge is all 
there is in the id."9 
Basically, the id is the instinctual agent and is, as Wollheim 
(1983) describes, the direct heir of the unconscious.10 It 
is, furthermore, the congealment of the unacceptables of 
personal history because it is, according to Freud, the 
original system of the personality. It is from the id that 
the ego and superego develop as differentiated parts of the 
personality. The id originates, from the time of birth at 
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least, as the conglomeration of all the inherited dispositions 
of the psycho-biology of the organism, as well as the instincts 
concomitant with 'being' such an organism. As such it is 
the storeroom of all psychic energy, deriving energy for 
and from bodily processes. In turn it supplies the ego and 
superego with energy for their functions. 
But, Freud posits, the id remains without knowledge of the 
external, objective reality. It consists solely of a subjec-
tive world of inner experience operating according to the 
'pleasure principle.' This principle basically works to 
reduce tension. This is because the id is postulated as 
not being able to tolerate increases in tension, excitation 
or need which produce unconscious 'feelings' of 'dissonance' 
which are uncomfortable and painful. Two processes work 
to reduce this tension, avoid pain and obtain pleasure and 
consonance for the id-organism.11 One is reflex action. 
This is simple reactions which virtually automatically reduce 
the state of tension. Sneezing, swallowing and blinking 
are examples. The other, a more complex process, is the 
primary process. This alternatively forms an image of the 
desired object or state in a wish-fulfilment procedure. This 
procedure is one in which the id imagines images of 
gratification to fulfil the desire. These internal mental 
images are the only reality that the id 'knows. ' The id 
does not 'know' objects as they are in external reality. 
The conscious ego is that which 'enables' the individual 
54 
to 'know' these. 
This means that the id functions in a way that is charac-
teristic of the unconscious mental life. This is one that 
is without a sense of time or logic, is wholly internalized 
and self-sustaining and is without any means for negation. 
In Freud's words, in the id "contrary impulses exist side 
by side without cancelling each other out or diminishing 
each other 11 .12 This means that the possible effects of con-
trary impulses not only co-exist but also continue any dis-
sonance, conflict and tension they may cause at the unconscious 
level. 
The characteristics and nature of the ego are, Freud shows, 
distinguishable from the id in three ways in its mode of 
relating to the external world. The ego 'evolves' because 
of the id-organism•sll need to interact realistically with 
the external world to ensure survival. The id cannot do 
this. The three ways that the ego deals with the world are: 
by perceiving the world ( in terms of what Freud called the 
System Pcpt (perception)); by changing the world (what Freud 
called 'approaches to motility'; and by adapting to the 
world (basically with the aid of the systems of defence 
(defence mechanisms)).13 
Basically the ego, unlike the id, distinguishes between the 
objective real world and the subjective inner world of id-
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wish-fulfilment. It needs to realistically and appropriately 
reduce the state of tension and dissonance in the organism 
that needs and drives may exact. It therefore operates accord-
ing to what Freud termed the reality principle. This secondary 
process, in distinction to the primary process of the pleasure 
principle, seeks to discharge tension only when appropriate 
objects are available.14 
By doing so, Freud explains, the ego 'suspends' the id's 
pleasure principle's immediate quest for pleasure and avoidance 
of displeasure to test reality. The ego therefore uses cog-
nitive and intellectual functions to 'decide' what best to 
do. It thus serves an executive function, using the higher 
mental processes allied to the reality principle which, Freud 
explains, "promises more certainty and greater success" in 
dealing with the conflict of interest between id demands 
and the external world.15 
As such, the ego has the difficult task of serving what Freud 
calls 'three tyrannical masters.' These are the id, the 
superego and the external world. Again, to use Freud's own 
words, the ego "does what it can to bring their claims and 
demands into harmony with one another. 11 16 Naturally this 
executive function, of mediating and regulating, is not an 
easy task. Dissonance stress, 
result. This is because the 
anxiety and other 
ego has to ensure 
'feelings' 
individual 
happiness and survival and that this takes place in a socially 
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appropriate way. To do so 
appropriately directed so that 




advantageously appropriated and states of tension, conflict 
or dissonance do not debilitate. 
It is the fact that the ego is very much a 'bodily ego' that 
the crux of its executive functioning can be seen. Wollheim 
usefully makes three points to explain Freud's assertion 
that the "ego is first and foremost a bodily ego. 11 17 Firstly, 
the growth of consciousness and perception of the world result 
from the ego differentiating itself from the world. Secondly, 
it is because of this 'growth' that the ego emerges out of 
the id. Thirdly, the concept of the ego brings self-awareness 
and the ego itself into existence. The differentiation between 
levels of identity explains these divisions and developments 
of awareness in another way in Chapter One above. 
For Freud, the ego is the "sense organ of the entire appa-
ratus. 11 18 It functions as a mediating and regulating agent. 
As Wollheim reminds us, the ego is "systematic in ways unknown 
to the id. 11 19 Furthermore, as Freud himself explained, the 
ego is "A coherent organization of mental processes. 11 20 
Because this system receives its energy from the id, Freud 
argues, the id-ego relationship is similar to the horse and 
rider situation. The former provides the energy whilst the 
latter decides and guides the employment of the energy. 
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The ego's role is more complicated than 
relationship such as in this analogy. 
participates in the process of energy 
a simple working 
The superego also 
management. Stein 
(1969) uses the car, driver and parental-instructor-inner 
voice analogy to explain the id-energy-ego executive and 
superego inner voice matrix, in the same way that Freud sees 
the superego as the internalized standards and teachings 
of the riding instructor. These analogies explain, to some 
extent, the complex network of psychic functioning. Clearly 
the basic issue is one of energy control and the effects 
of the energy not being controlled, if and when the ego does 
not fulfil it's executive functions. 
The superego, the moral derivative of the ego's executive 
functioning, is essentially a critical agent, judging the 
ego' s control of the id energy. The superego results from 
the incorporation21 of parental-authority figures by the 
child as it grows up. These internalizations need not neces-
sarily accurately replicate the standards and norms of the 
figures. Nevertheless, the superego, as heir to the Oedipus 
Complex, confronts the rest of the ego. This is vis-a-vis 
the ego's mediation and regulation of id demands in contra-
distinction to the demands of the external world and the 
constructs the superego holds. The latter in turn imposes 
another set of demands that can be, by their very nature, 
normative. That is, the superego stands in judgement of 
the ego's efforts to control the id and have the individual 
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live appropriately. 
This judgemental stance occurs because, by its very idealistic 
and moralistic nature, the superego is the internal representa-
tion of a particularized tradition of values and ideals. 
These are those of the ambient socio-cultural environment 
in which the individual, parents and others are located. 
The parents interpret and shape these values, ideals and 
norms in the parenting socialization process. Gradually 
parental control is replaced with self-control as the indi-
vidual ego-superego establishes and maintains a personal, 
self-regulating 'moral' faculty. 
That is, 
process, 
the superego a 
occurs in the 
particular 
development 
result of a particular 
of the functioning of 
the ego. It results from the internalization of socio-parental 
standards. It is therefore something that has its own par-
ticular history. Thus, Freud argues, it needs to be dis-
tinguished from other ethical-religious constructs such as 
what theologians call a "God-given faculty of conscience" 
for example.22 
Freud makes it quite clear that 'conscience' is a term he 
applies to a particular sub-system of the superego.23 He 
does of course use the word somewhat idiosyncraticly. For 
Freud it is not 'God-given.' It is rather the incorpora-
tion of parental standards about 'wrongs' that causes feelings 
59 
of inferiority, inadequacy and guilt. This sub-system is, 
Freud states, different to a second superego sub-system, 
that of the 'Ego Ideal.' 24 This latter sub-system is the 
incorporation of parental standards of what they approve 
of and which can cause feelings of self-worth and pride. 
With the aid of these two sub-systems, the superego, Freud 
explains, "enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, follows its 
own intentions and is independent of the ego for its supply 
of energy. 11 25 This is also because it gets its energy direct 
from the id. Wollheim's assessment neatly explains the posi-
tion in this regard: 
"The energy of the superego is aggression. For the 
superego in its confrontation with the ego, draws upon 
that portion of the death instinct which was projected 
upon the parental figure that was its prototype 
This is what Freud had in mind when he wrote .•. 
superego merges into the id: indeed as heir to 
Oedipus Complex, it has intimate relations with 




The superego' s aggresi ve functions of "self-observation, 
of conscience and of (maintaining) the ideal, 11 27 indicate 
how it does three things. First, the superego inhibits and 
controls the impulses of the id. Second, it does so whilst 
seeking the moralistic goals of parental societal 'rights' 
of behaviour and causes feelings of discomfort when these 
are violated or breached. Third, the superego strives for 
perfection in terms of that which Freud deemed to be the 
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"higher side of human life, n28 or what he elsewhere calls 







of the superego are not necessarily 
Wollheim has identified four features 
"illuminate many of the paradoxes in 
our everyday life. n29 These are presented below and under-
lined. A brief commentary follows each by way of explanation. 
1. The peculiar harshness of the superego 
The harshness must be related to the superego's aggressive 
content as indicated by Freud in its relationship to 
the id. Moreover, the degree of harshness will be deter-
mined by the degree of the id's demands. That is, as 
Wollheim explains, the superego' s harshness is a neces-
sary, and by its nature, severe 'mechanism' as it seeks 
to effect control. 
2. The systematic discrepancy between the individual's 
superego standards and the individual's actual behaviour 
The discrepancy between the superego's standards and 
the individual's actual behaviour, reflects, in the 
Freudian view, the differing sources and determinants 
of moral authority and actual behaviour. The superego, 
as heir to external moral authority, is an internalized 
version of the moral authority. Consequently, individuals 
invariably do behave contrary to the dictates and wishes 
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of the superego and the discrepancy invokes situations 
of inner conflict and subsequent dissonance in feelings 
of guilt. 
3. The intertwined erotic and ethical elements of (moral) 
mental life 
The intertwining relates to the basic drives of pleasure-
seeking being contrary to appropriate or conventional 
expression of the desire for pleasure. Thus what is 
erotic may not be ethically or morally 'permissable.' 
Ethics and morals are determined in terms of their spe-
cific socio-religious contexts and the degree of inter-
twining between erotic and ethical elements varies a 
great deal. 
4. The connection of the superego with the Oedipus Complex 
The connection shows how there can so easily be the 
continuation of neurosis from early developmental problems 
into the later years. Clearly the Oedipus Complex is 
one such network of developmental problems which, as 
a complex, affects subsequent development and experience. 




of the energies 
it is to 'feel guilty.' The superego can 
over-scrupulous and harsh in its 'moral' 
the ego for some or other 'mismanagement' 
of the id. Moreover, dissonance and guilt 
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feelings over some or other action can also exist independently 
of any moral feeling about the action. The converse can 
also be true when the superego seems to function in a third 
sub-system, differing from the conscience and ego ideal 
sub-systems. This function could be termed the sub-system 
of 'personal experience values' that evolves and exists as 
a consequence of parental-societal internalizations. 
As Wollheim explains, the intertwining of the erotic and 
the ethical is most evident in the dissonance and guilt feel-
ings that so easily develop in the 'first love' experience. 
The ethics and 'morality' of sexual practice inevitably con-
flict with the erotics and pleasure-now demands of sexual 
gratification and desire reflecting and continuing any Oedipus 
Complex conflict feelings too. The guilt feelings that result 
from any misdirection of feelings from this latter arena 
of psycho-sexual development similarly generate paradoxical 
situations in the individual's inner moral world's confronta-
tion with the external world's morality-system. 
This confrontation points to how the superego can at times 
be opposed to both the id and the ego. Yet, the superego 
is like the ego in trying to control the id's instincts and 
demands as well as being like the id in its non-rationality. 
However, because it seeks to permanently block and control 
id demands, the superego differs from the ego. It thus may 
be over-scrupulous in its functioning. It is in this si tua-
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tion, as an over-harsh construct that pinpoints and inflates 
discrepancies and misdemeanours in behaviour, that the superego 
seems to be most influential. This influence is compounded 
by the superego' s ability to seek and attain the permanent 
repression of material to the unconscious, and therefore 
non-dangerous but not non-effective, levels of awareness. 
This repressed material nevertheless can continue to have 
unconscious effects on personality functioning. Freud looked 
at this in terms of the different functions of the ego which 
manifests resistance to prevent repressed material from return-
ing to consciousness. It appears that to effect this control 
the ego and the superego co-operate unconsciously. From 
this it is evident that the ego and superego can and do operate 
both consciously and unconsciously. Problematic results 
of repression and resistance provide the 'situation' with 
which the therapist has to work, if the individual is unable 
to resolve their own problems. 
2.2 
THE DYNAMICS OP FREUD'S THEORY 
The dynamics of Freud' s theory of functioning can be seen, 
albeit simplistically, as three co-operating, sometimes con-
flicting, systems. Generally these three differing psycho-
logical entities work together as a team to ensure optimal 
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functioning in a contented inner environment that, free from 
debilitating tension ( s) and dissonance, realistically appro-
priates the best from the external world in a symbiotic 
relationship for optimal survival. 
In New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (NILOP), Freud 
gives a useful colloquial illustration of his theory in the 
analogy of an imaginery "country with a landscape of varying 
configuration with a mixed population • • • who carry on 
different activities. Although there is necessary and evident 
partitioning, there is also disorderliness and mixing with 
some deviations in the details. 11 30 This lucidly and succinctly 
encapsulates the id, ego, superego differentiation and con-
tiguity. 
In essence, Freud's theory of mental and personality function-
ing is a dynamic one that explores and explains the motivating 
forces for and of human mental behaviour. He called these 
motive forces the instincts.31 These are basically the Freud-
ian psychological equivalent of drives. They constitute 
the psychic energy that is the individual's and consist of 
two aspects. One is psychological - Freud called this the 
wish. The other is biological - this Freud called the need. 
Instincts, Freud argued, are either life instincts (eros) 
or death instincts (thanatos). The former constitute the 
libido or psychic energy and forms the id. They are construe-
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tive forces, seeking survival of individual and species. 
The latter constitute aggressive, destructive drives. Thus, 
both kinds of drives or instincts dynamically interrelate 
in the psychic functioning of the individual. That is, the 
ego and superego, derivatives of the id, propel and determine 
the behaviour and nature of the individual in direct relation-
ship to their instincts. 
Ideally the id, ego and superego work together as an harmonious 
team. The ego satisfies the id's demands in ways approved 
by the superego. The individual is then able to live without 
psychopathology, expressing emotions reasonably and sensibly 
without any sense of debilitating guilt and dissonance. Such 
an ideal situation is clearly qualitatively different from 
situations in which either the id or the superego dominate 
psychic functioning. This occurs when the id dominates, 
and instincts become unbridled and the individual is, at 
worst, a danger to him or herself and/or society. When the 
superego dominates, the individual's behaviour is too rigidly 
controlled and judged. The result is a miserable, over-
sensitive and lowered self-esteem individual with possible 





Freud's model evolved out of his earlier topographical theory 
into his structural theory of the human mind because clinical 
data contradicted and challenged the earlier paradigm. 
Consequently the model is a self-confirming one because the 
data used to verify it is obtained through methods which 
ascribe to the model. That is, the facts of psychodynamic 
functioning of the human mind are identified and assessed 
according to psychodynamic theory in the process of 
psychoanalysis in a circular process of definition. 
Moreover, the facts of psychodynamic functioning according 
to this theory are only theoretical constructs. Their actual 
observable manifestations are not self-evident. In this 
way they are similar to the unobservable nature of drives 
and the conscience whilst similarly being patently responsible 
for feelings and mental states within the individual that 
affect visible behaviours. The usefulness of Freud's theory 
is thus in the way that it nevertheless provides a systematic 
means of identifying and explaining what is going on inside 
one person when assessed by another. 
The theory, as the paradigmatic statement for psychoanalysis 
as a therapeutic approach, locates the origins of abnormal 
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functioning in childhood experiences or events that have 
been particularly emotionally painful. These painful, discom-
forting experiences and events have somehow interfered with 
and affected normal personality development. As a consequence, 
the individual is unable to resolve conscious and unconscious 
conflicts, dissonance and impulses except by maladaptive 
strategies. The location of causes of feelings of dissonance 
and conflict in specific events and experiences intimates 
how and where the therapeutic process has to begin so that 
effective resolution will occur and facilitate appropriate 
adaptive strategies. 
Freud's theory of psychodynamic structures of the human mind 
is holistic as it recognises the relationships between the 
different components of the personality and their functioning 
as observed in behaviour. Similarly, the theory accounts 
for the multiple determinants of actions and does not attribute 
results to single causes. Specific causes, once identified 
in earlier events and experiences, are allied to the entire 
case history of the individual with references made to other 
aspects of Freudian analysis such as psychosexual development, 
defense mechanisms as well as the general role and understand-
ing of the unconscious in personality functioning. 
By making the individual life the centre of the individual' s 
control and experience, the theory does not conceive of any 
component or role to be played by some outside agency such 
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as Christ in the Christian conception. That is, Freud's 
theory is egocentric rather than Christocentric and sees 
the individual unit as a self-contained entity which, although 
influenced by the outside environment, is not directed or 
required to live in any particular way such as the Christian 
conception advocates. In this way, the theory sees the indi-
vidual totally responsible for his or her actions and reactions 
with no recourse to any outside agency. 
The theory is therefore a secular 
functioning which means that the 
ethical obligations are different 
conception of personality 
points of reference for 
to those in conceptions 
that are construed by systems of religion. That is, the 
ethical obligations in Freud's theory are construed in terms 
of egocentric and anthropocentric considerations about what 
is right and wrong for the individual and humankind. The 
considerations are thus formulated without reference to con-
ceptions of what is right and wrong according to some system 
of religion but are construed more explicitly in relation 
to norms of appropriate, adaptive personality functioning 
and behaviour. 
The view that individuals are not motivated by instinctual 
drives which control psychic energy behind all human action 
thus explains how the dissonance of guilt feelings can occur 
when instinctual drives initiate disharmony in id ego and 
superego functioning. The drives, or instincts, in confronta-
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tion with how and when they can be expressed in need satisfac-
tion and goal attainment, indicate how dissonance can eventuate 
when appropriate goal objects are unavailable or when goal 
objects are incongruous. In this way, Freud's theory neatly 
confirms the conclusions of the phenomenological consideration 
of the individual presented in Chapter One. That is, the 
id can be seen as that which was described as the 'unit' 
in differentiation to the 'identity' that is known by the 
ego. Similarly, the id consists of needs which the ego seeks 
to satisfy. The process of satisfaction also involves the 
superego judging the appropriateness of the id's 'needs', 
'drives' and 'goals' and how the ego deals with them. 
In this regard it is interesting to note that Freud used 
the German word 'trieb', meaning drive and the word instinct 
has been used, "for reasons of style and grammar and to avoid 
anachronistic misrepresentation of Freud's ideas ... 32 Freud's 
own words best explain his conception of the instincts and 
how they are in effect instinctual drives: 
An instinct, then, is distinguished from a stimulus 
by the fact that it arises from sources of stimulation 
within the body, that it operates as a constant force 
and that the subject cannot avoid it by flight, as is 
possible with an external stimulus. We can distinguish 
an instinct's source, object and aim. Its source is 
a state of excitation in the body, its aim is the removal 
of that excitation; on its path from its source to 
its aim the instinct becomes operative psychically. 
We picture it as a certain quota of energy which presses 
in a particular direction. It is from this pressing 
that it derives its name of 'Trieb' .33 
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The implications of the theory's self-confirming nature, 
its usefulness as a therapeutic theoretical system, its loca-
tion of causes in specific events and experiences, its holis-
tic, secular and egocentric conceptions of the individual 
and its appraisal of instinctual drives all indicate the 
extent and importance of Freud' s theory in any consideration 
of the human condition. It clearly stands as a third possi-
bility for viewing personality functioning with the phenomeno-
logical view from the inside and the religious conceptions 
as reified proscriptions from the outside being the two princi-
pal theoretical formulations it differs from. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Freud's theory affords a useful means of looking at the proces-
ses involved in psychopathology, and, more specifically, 
how the condition and experience of 'feeling guilty' can 
be viewed psychodynamically. Issue has not been taken with 
nee-Freudian, anti-Freudian or any other assessment of Freud's 
theory. This is because his theory has been set out here 
for use in referring to a theoretical construct of mental 
and personality functioning in which the condition and ex-
perience of 'feeling guilty' can begin to be understood. 
The extent to which it is a closed-system model suits this 
purpose. This is because the condition of feeling guilty 
is also a closed-system of cause and effect in the inner 
environment of the individual. This means the aim is to 
find the most appropriate means to enter this closed-system 
in order to effect therapy when this is required. 
It can be concluded therefore that Freud sets out a useful 
theory of personality functioning with particular reference 
to the role of the unconscious. From this theory it can 
be seen how, when motives are unconscious, the motive its elf 
and the distress it gives to consciousness are invariably 
responsible for psychopathological symptoms and inhibitions 
of dissonance. 
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In short, Freud's theory of the effects of the unconscious 
gives three astute perceptions about personality functioning. 
These are, firstly, that the individual possesses networks 
of ideas, feelings, beliefs and attitudes which are not con-
sciously realized. By their nature these networks consist 
of sub-networks which can conflict and cause dissonance. 
Thus, second, the networks and their conflicts influence 
the individual at the conscious level. These influences 
can be related to specific personal-history events, so that, 
third, some networks establish complexes which have particular 
effects in later years after their genesis in childhood. 
The Oedipus Complex is one such theoretically hypothesized 
network-complex. 
Freud's theory of personality functioning is thus a fundamental 
paradigmatic statement in psychological discourse. As such 
it is a particularly secular and egocentric conception of 
the status, purpose and functioning of the individual. The 
Christian Biblical conception of the individual alternatively 
propounds a distinctly religious conception of the individual. 
Accordingly, a presentation of this conception therefore 
appears necessary to gain a foothold in religious discourse 
about the individual and states of dissonance. 
73 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE CHRISTIAN BIBLICAL CONCEPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
The Bible, the cannonized collection of Christian writings 
consisting of the Old and New Testaments, has presented the 
world with a particular conception of life and living. Its 
writers, and those who accept what they wrote, hold a network 
of convictions about the world and the place of the individual 
in it. The nature and the content of these convictions has 
shaped the lives of many. 
ed as authoritative writ 
religion. 
This is because the Bible is regard-
for Christianity, a major world 
For the purposes of this thesis a basic outline of the Biblical 
Christian conception of the individual was considered neces-
sary. The debates about revelation, scripture and authority, 
as well as what religion is, will not be entered into. This 
chapter is intended to provide an outline of the Bible's 
basic conception of the individual as a creature. How this 
notion of creatureliness affects the individual will be dis-
cussed. 
Several pertinent Biblical and Christian words and concepts 
form the basis of the presentation. The analysis of them 
traces their meanings and significance as comprehensively 
as possible in and for the lives of individuals with particular 
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reference the dissonance of guilt feelings and how these 
have been engendered by this conception. 
The exclusive language some texts of the Bible use for details 
and ideas about the nature and functioning of the individual 
is oftentimes unclear because of masculine terminology. The 
many different original Hebrew words denoting differences 
in age, sex, status, rank and position had their specific 
nuances negated in translation to the Greek words for man 
and mankind, anthropos and aner. The Biblical sense of man 
will nevertheless be taken as referring to humankind and 
used accordingly. 
Complexities of literary and historical criticism has meant 
using references from the Bible has been a selective process 
to prevent quoting out of context and ascribing thoughts 
to the wrong writers. The presentation below is therefore 
intended to provide the salient and pertinent aspects of 
the conceptions of the Bible in outline form so an appropriate 
understanding of this major conception of human nature, and 
its influential implications, is achieved. 
This chapter thus consists of three parts. The first considers 
the Old and New Testament's conceptions of the individual 
to arrive at a general statement of the Biblical Christian 
conception of the individual.l The second part explores 
some of the implications of this conception. In particular, 
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the nature and the role of sin and sins is dealt with. The 
implications of sin, contiguous on the development and faculty 
of conscience, with the concomitant advent of guilt feelings, 




THE OLD TESTAMENT, NEW TESTAMENT AND CHRISTIAN BIBLICAL 
CONCEPTION 
The Old Testament (OT) conception of the individual is contain-
ed in its understanding of the particular weakness, transitory 
rnortali ty and creatureliness of humankind whilst taking note 
of the general significance of humanity in creation as a 
whole. Both accounts of Creation, as found in Genesis 1 : 1 ff 
and 2 : 4 ff, place human beings as the most important factors 
to come out of the process. 2 In both accounts, the human 
creature is presented as second only to the Creator God in 
terms of the role that humanity is to have in the grand design 
of the Creation.3 
This status, is evident in the way humans have power and 
authority over all else (Gen 1 : 26), are required to cultivate 
and protect their environment, (Gen 2 : 15) and were respon-
sible for naming all the other created things ( Gen 2 : 19). 
Moreover, they are in close, direct communication with the 
Creator God. This relationship enforces the notion that 
humankind existed solely in terms of having been given life 
from the Creator and would inevitably be tied to the Creator 
as creatures. Thus, despite the breaking off of direct corn-
rnunication because of the Fall (Gen 3), the notion of creature-
liness continues to make humankind cognizant of their Creator. 
77 
The rationale and the implications of the Story of the Fall 
are not pertinent at this point. 4 It is simply necessary 
to note that, as 'fallen creatures,' human individuals are 
presented in the OT as whole units with different aspects. 
These aspects make them what they are. This is because these 
aspects are not conceived of as differentiated parts, as 
was later to be expounded in the Greek division of the indi-
vidual into body, mind and soul. In the OT conception of 
the individual, the different aspects are represented in 
the words flesh, spirit, heart and soul. Each individual 
consisted of these four aspects, none of which was seen as 
existing independently of the others. 
The Hebrew word for flesh, basar, refers to humankind's origins 
in the material dust and indicates transitoriness. Psalm 7 8 
v 39 uses the word so that the English version is translated 
to read: "He remembered they were only mortal beings, like 
a wind blows by and is gone." Similarly, the Hebrew word 
for spirit, ruah, refers to humankind's relation to the Creator 
God as a creature made alive by this God. The third aspect 
of the individual in the OT conception, the soul, is represent-
ed by the Hebrew word nepes. This referred to humans being 
life bound up within one body and living as one body. It 
did not ref er to a separate or pre-existent or immortal part 
of the person. It was conceived of as an aspect of the parti-
cular, living whole. 
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The word for heart in Hebrew, leeae, refers to the individual's 
actual inner essential nature as opposed to any nature that 
may be presented or assumed. This inner faculty was considered 
to be the controlling instrument which regulated the indi-
vidual's life appropriately, and was seen as the centre of 
self-understanding and self-knowledge as well as knowledge 
and understanding of the environment. 
In this regard, the heart was seen as specifically concerned 
with morality, particularly religious morality. The reason 
for this was that OT morality was wholly bound up in considera-
tions of divine law as the fabric of all law. As such, the 
heart was seen as a controlling mechanism of the individual 
and as a personal, ultimately public, index of the individual's 
essential nature. In this sense the OT conception of the 
heart can be seen as a correlate of the faculty of conscience. 
In fact, the Hebrew word leb, meaning conscience, is clearly 
cognate with lebab. 
This mainstream OT conception of the individual human being 
is still extant in Rabbinic Judaism.5 As such it still shapes 
the lives and worldviews of many individuals who are directly 
or indirectly linked to the Jewish world religion. Two seminal 
alternatives to this mainstream conception are found in subse-
quent developments that produced Gnosticism and Christianity. 
The New Testament (NT) Christian conception of the individual 
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continues from that of the OT. 
always and absolutely known in 
The three basic OT assumptions 
That is, the individual is 
relation to the Creator God. 
of creatureliness, mortality 
and disobedience remain cornerstones of the NT conception. 
Human existence remains contingent only in and through the 
presence, plans and grace of 
argues, has now gone to the 
Save humankind from Sin. 
the Crea tor God whom, 
extent of Sending His 
the NT 
Son to 
Consideration of the doctrines, beliefs and attitudes attached 
to the words capitalized in the sentence above are beyond 
the orbit of this discussion. Suffice to say the NT sets 
out the elements for constructing the world view these words 
relate to. A simplistic outline of this worldview indicates 
that in it, all individuals are seen as sinners, and they 
can be redeemed from their sin only through the life and 
death of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. 
Hence, according to the NT, individuals have the opportunity 
and purpose of seeking God-like, or Christ-like, perfection 
because the Creator God has made this possible. He also 
provided a model in Christ. 6 From this, the NT conception 
asserts, the Creator God values humankind. Therefore, humanity 
owes obedience and service within a renewed symbiotic Creator-
creature relationship which would evince Christian living. 
As a major exponent of the Christian world view on life and 
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living, one of the principle NT writers, Paul, elaborates 
on this particular conception of the individual. The Pauline 
conception seeks to sharply differentiate between the old 
self, who, without Christ was perverted, culpable and bound 
in sin, and different to the new, Christian self. This new 
sense of self the individual can have, Paul argued, was one 
that enabled the individual, through Christ, to be free, 
renewed and led by the Holy Spirit. What Paul meant is 
explained in this passage from his letter to the Ephesians: 
So get rid of your old self, which made you live 
as you used to, - the old self that was being des-
troyed by its deceitful desires. Your hearts and 
minds must be made completely new, and you must 
put on the new self, which, is created in God's 
likeness and reveals its elf in the true life that 
is upright and holy. ( 4 : 22 ff) 
This points to a rather radicle lifestyle change and marks 
a shift in personality theory from the OT. The OT conception 
of the individual could not have theoretically construed 
two distinctly different lifestyles in the way that Paul 
has. The OT only pointed to the deviation from the normal, 
without positing a new life taking over from another. In 
addition, the OT could not conceive of a Christ-like power 
affecting this. This was because the individual, in their 
fallen state, was seen as personally responsible for ensuring 








responsible for introducing two other new notions 
NT conception of the individual that differ from 
The new self, is Paul argues, complemented with 
which, as part of the existence of the individual 
life, is sown in a physical body ( some psychikon). 
This would be raised, through Christ, in a spiritual resurrec-
tion body ( some penumatikon) when the dead are raised to 
life. This second notion, as presented in I Corinthians 
15 : 42 ff is a clear shift from the OT idea of the soul. 
The OT conception of the individual did not see the possibility 
of a soul existing or developing in this way, as it was con-
sidered an aspect, not a part, of the individual that had 
a purpose of its own. 
The other notion Paul introduced results from his use of 
the word pneuma. This word means spirit and refers to the 
inner-self state and concept of self-consciousness. This 
knowledge of self, Paul arg~es, seeks to experience, to under-
stand experience, and to relate the individual to the environ-
ment, in terms of the will of God through Christ. Thus, 
Paul asserts, Christians have a mechanism obliging them to 
live not as human nature dictates, but to 
"live as the Spirit tells you to - if, in fact, God's 
spirit lives in you." 
(Rom 8 9) 
This is Paul's theme in his Letter to the Romans, Chapter 8, 
82 
which deals with the practicalities of 'Life in the Spirit. ' 
He argues that it is the spirit which wills the individual 
to be rational, moral, upright and true, with these cognitive 
processes primarily realized in the mind of the individual. 
These realizations, Paul concludes, are the faculty and func-
tion of syneidesis - the conscience. 
The Johannine conception of the individual in John's NT writing 
is also important for assessing the NT understanding of indi-
vidual functioning and the worldview it is located in. John 
has, like Paul, specific concerns which build on and differ 
from OT concerns. Humankind's beligerent living in opposition 
to the Creator God is one issue of concern. John argues 
it is wrong humanity continues to fall victim to the ways 
of the world that do not accord with the will of the Creator. 
John therefore points to the decision choice that is necessary 
for the individual to make between the world and God. Evidence 
for this can be found in John 15: 19 and 19 and I John 
5 : 3 ff:-
"If the world hates you, know that it has hated me before 
it hated you. If you were of the world, the world would 
love its own; but because you are not of the world, 
but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world 
hates you," and 
"For this is the love of God, that we keep his command-
ments. And his commandments are not burdensome. For 
whatever is born of God overcomes the world; and this 
is the victory that overcomes the world, our faith. 
Who is it that overcomes the world but he who believes 
that Jesus is the Son of God?", respectively. 
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Clearly then, in Paul's and John's conceptions of humankind 
in the NT, the conceptions of the OT world assumptions remain. 
These are that the human creature need and can only be con-
sidered in terms of his, 
God. 
God. 
Human existence is 
Life is therefore 
or her relationship to the Creator 
seen as contingent only on this 
effective and correct only in so 
far as it is carred out in accordance with the will of God. 
This is because, as creatures, individuals are dependent 




therefore are responsible beings, 
the relationship has been broken 
or is misconstrued because individuals are not always willing 
to accept or acknowledge this symbiosis. 
3.2 
/ 
SIN AND SINS 
Because the symbotic Creator-creature relationship is not 
always acknowledged or accepted, the concepts of sin and 
sins became part of the Biblical conception. This was because 
these concepts reified defects in the relationship.7 In 
addition, they pointed to the implications of the defaults 
either explicitly or implicitly. Thus it was both assumed 
and declared in the Biblical conception that, because of 
the sin and sins of default, individuals were no longer whole, 
free creatures as originally intended by the Creator.8 Instead 
they lived with a sense and in a state of alienation from 
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Him and this alienation affected all other aspects and activi-
ties of their being human. 
To a large extent the Story of the Fall ( Genesis 3) is taken 
therefore as doctrine to explain this curious state of af-
fairs. 9 In addition, the Story of the Life and Resurrection 
of Jesus Christ is taken as doctrine to explain the means 
of changing this state of affairs. Consequently, Jesus Christ 
is conceived of as the last new Adam, who points to ·the possi-
bili ty and actuality of an un-alienated form of existence. 
This point of view is lucidly explained by Paul in I Corin-
thians 15 : 45 ff. Here he deals with the culmination of 
Christian hope and belief, in the resurrection of the dead 
through Christ, when the state of alienation would be ended 
for ever. Paul writes: 
"Thus it is written, 'The first man Adam became a living 
being"; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit ..•. 
Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, 
we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven .•• 
we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed 
and the dead will be raised imperishable . . • . For 
this perishable nature must put on the imperishable, 
and this mortal nature must put on immortality." 
The Bil::)le writings as a whole presented the world with a 
set of 'Christian' assumptions and attitudes which, as the 
constituents of conceptions, have shaped a particular world-
view. One consequence of this particular worldview, in which 
there are many permutations, is that humankind has a particular 
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role and destiny to fulfil and has the freedom to contravene 
any or all aspects of either or both role and destiny. In 
essence contravention meant sin .as contravention was considered 
to be against the will of the Creator God. This understanding 
seems implicit in the decision-choice made by Adam and Eve, 
in which all people throughout the decision choices of their 
own lives share in, as a necessary consequence of being human. 
That is, each individual, in this conception, has the propen-
sity to commit sins or be in a state of sin simply because 
he can choose not to obey the will of God. This notion con-
firms and relates to the issues of the universality and 
inevitability of the dissonance of guilt in human experience. 
It is important to note differences between the OT understand-
ing of sin as compared to the NT. In the OT, it is apparent 
that sin is universal and that humankind are all sinners 
by nature and by relation. This mysterious state of affairs 
is taken as a given in the religion by which it was formulated. 
Attempts were made nevertheless to explain the origins and 
the implications of the mystery of the actuality of sin and 
humankind's separation and alienation for the Creator God. 
The Story of Adam and Eve and the serpent ( Genesis 3) and 
of Satan in the life of the good man Job are two notable 
examples (Book of Job).10 
These two stories function as religious myth to illustrate 
basic assumptions of this particular religion and represent 
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basic doctrinal beliefs continuing through the OT into the 
New Testament. One of these is that every sin brings a conse-
quence of punishment because it was conceived to be in the 
very nature of the Creator God to be angered when affronted 
by His creatures' wrong doing. Another is that evil is a 
real force in the creature and is at work as a part of the 
nature of things. 
Evil is seen as something within and beyond the realm of 
things contrary to the will of the Creator God.11 In either 
situation, humankind was obliged and responsible, despite 
the contrary pressures of evil, to try to live as free but 
obedient creatures. Sin was seen as being the total state 
of not doing so. Sins were seen as the specific acts which 
were not concordant with such standards of obedience and 
therefore constituted being in a state of sin.12 
Sins were considered to be actions which were wrong because 
they were contrary to the normal. In going against the normal 
they were immediately perceived as against the Created Order 
and will of the Creator. Thus, in OT writing and thought, 
all sins were seen as against God primarily and thereby also 
against the community, social justice and normality. There-
fore, any and all sins were perceived as resulting in a state 
of sin. Judaism and its OT antecedents developed an elaborate 
system of ritual and sacrifice to negate these effects and 
re-establish atonement. This was because being in a state 
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of a sin was an undesirable condition to be in. The ritual 
of atonement in Leviticus 16 indicates one means of changing 
this condition. 
To understand the OT conception of sin and abhorrence of 
it, it is useful to refer to Pidoux's (1958) article on the 
subject.13 Pidoux explains the Israelites differentiated 
good actions from evil actions. This was because actions 
were seen as expressions of the real · nature of the actor. 
As the normal and good was taken to be that which accorded 
with the will and the laws of the Creator God, that which 
was abnormal in any way was seen as being necessarily contrary 
to the divine will. Accordingly, good actions were taken 
as disclosures of normal, well balanced personalities. Bad 
or evil actions however were considered disclosures of person-
alities in conflict and lacking real moral and mental health. 
Hebrew words used to denote evil actions connote something 
distorted and twisted, something unjust or plainly rebel-
lious.14 
Two other points explain the OT understanding of 
first is that because of the importance of the 




in it, any breach of norms or violation of them by an indi-
vidual was taken as something that damaged the community 
as a whole. This was because the community was seen as insti-
tuted by the Creator God. Transgression against His will 
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therefore also devolved into and out of any transgression 
against the community. The reason for this was that any 
transgression meant consequence, and the consequences would 
affect the community, not only the transgressor.ls 
The second point is that because the community of the people 
of Israel was seen as being instituted by the Creator God, 
and His laws were taken as the Law, there was no possibility 
of any secularizing differentiation between religious sin 
and other sin. In terms of the Mosaic covenant, all law-
breaking was sin because all were inevitably ultimately direct 
offences against the Creator God. 
Despite this apparent conceptual unity about sin in the OT 
being any and all contraventions of the Divine Creator God's 
will, resulting in the individual's alienation from the Creator 
God, there is no actual semantic unity. Gottfried Quell 
(1951), in a comprehensive coverage of sin in the OT, points 
out that the OT does not contain a unified exposition of 
what sin is, if it is indeed a single concept or term in 
it at a11.l6 
This discrepancy can be resolved when it is considered that 
the original Hebrew vocabulary was far more complex and varied 
than could be accurately translated into other languages. 
Consequently nuances of meaning and linguistic specifics 
of the original writers' contexts have been affected. Never-
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theless, a fairly exhaustive idea of sin, made up from a 
re-examination of the many words and terms and their applica-
tion, does constitute a fairly sound and accurate theological 
unity. 
The basic theological idea of sin, Quell argues, is thus 
that sin is some or other action which is deemed a deviation 
from the prescribed norm. These norms were determined by 
and within the specific doctrinal beliefs and assumptions 
contained in the OT worldview and the religion it ref erred 
to. However, as Quell points out, there is generally an 
emphasis on the psychical aspect of the action itself or 
of the situation it causes to result. This psychical condition 
of the actor constitutes concerns for mental health. This 
is because it is posited that by deviating from the norm 
and feeling bad about doing so, debilitating feelings of 
dissonance, such as those of guilt, can occur. 
It is significant that Quell states a considerable number 
of Hebrew words we can translate to mean sin "frequently 
seem to justify, or actually demand, the English word 'guilt' 
for their translation." Quell' s conclusion in this regard 
cogently explains the situation. He writes: 
" the Hebrews attached little importance to the dis-
tinction between sin and guilt, the causal connection 
being obvious between abnormal behaviour and an abnormal 
situation. 11 17 
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From this it can be seen why there is little or no explicit 
exposition of the dissonance condition of feeling guilty 
in the OT. This is because having committed a sin, feeling 
guilty was a concomitant response in the creature who was 
automatically cognizant of culpability before the Creator 
God. Obviously feelings of guilt were in direct correspondence 
to cognizance of culpability and responsibility and prescribed 
guilt did not necessarily mean felt guilt. 
Further enlightenment on this 
(1978).18 In looking at the 
issue is provided by Giinther 
Septuagint (LXX) translation 
of Hebrew words denoting sin, Giinther points out that a rela-
tively small number of Greek words are used as translations 
for the many Hebrew words. For example, the Greek word adika 
(guilt) used 250 times in the LXX, represents some 36 different 
Hebrew words. Some examples of Hebrew words are awon (offence 
guilt punishment) , awl ah (perversity wickedness) , hamas ( in-
justice) and seqer (lie). These words all refer to occasions 
of wrong, abnormal, anti-community and thereby anti-God be-
haviours. They are seen as sins and demand the actor to 
feel guilty about his or her wrongdoing. 
Thus the LXX manages, by using one word in place of thirty-six, 
to present a more concisely organized and more simply unified 
doctrine of sin than does the many worded Hebrew language 
of the OT. Georg Bertram (1951)19 argues that the LXX doctrine 
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of sin is expressed in consistent language usage in order 
t o propound the notion of fundamental sin. Fundamental sin 
is that which humankind inherits through relation to Adam 
and sharing in his Fall and is also the general state of 
humankind's predeliction to being against God. As proposed 
by Bertram, this concept of sin refers to that which occurs 
whenever human folly, presumptuousness, idolatry, wealth 
and power pollute and breach the natural, normal creature-
Creator symbiosis. 
Because of the Jesus event and all its implications, the 
NT conception of sin and humankind, although grounded in 
the world of the OT, has new' dimensions.20 These shape an 
even more particular worldview differing from the OT. In 
the NT there is a general conception of sin being the misunder-
standing, by the created, of the Creator God's will.21 This 
obviously has its roots in the OT conception of sin being 
any and all actions which, in deviating from the norm, are 
against God. 
In the NT there are warnings, from Jesus Christ himself, 
against prescriptive legalism and hypocrisy. In fact, Phari-
saic standards and attitudes are derided as exemplified in 
Matthew 12 and 23. Nevertheless, sin in the NT is not seen 
as a less powerful and less threatening anti-God construct.22 
J esus himself recognizes and unceasingly points out the reality 
of sin with of course the added dimension of His victory 
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over it. His life and resurrection create a new world situa-
tion and worldview because He is seen as having conquered 
sin. 
This new situation is seen to mean humankind can no longer 
be unconditionally alienated from God simply because of sharing 
in humanity's Fall and alienation through Adam. However, 
the Creator-God-created relationship is not yet fully restored. 
Life needs to still be lived with freedom to err in the quest 
of becoming more and more Christ-like. That is, the individual 
can and inevitably will, commit sins against the normal, 
the natural and the will of the Creator God. But, only in 
extreme, self-determined circumstances, when the pressures 
of the world and the evil of it are anti-God, will the indi-
vidual reach the state of sin wherein he is wholly and 
absolutely alienated from God. Particularized sins may violate 
and temporarily alienate the individual from God. But, as 
the Pauline and Johannine writings strive to make clear, 
individuals are able to set themselves free from sin and 
sins by acknowledging the role and the reality of Jesus Christ. 
This role and reality, they, as spokesmen of the NT Christian 
conception argue, has the purpose and the power to restore 
the created to his or her rightful relationship with the 
Creator God. 
It has already been established that the OT has no main general 
word for sin in its Hebrew origins. In addition, the OT 
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conception did not differentiate between sin and sins as 
all sins were considered to cause sin. This situation of 
apparent confusion was perhaps due to the fact that in the 
OT conception, sin, guilt and punishment were not seen as 
separates. Rather, they were seen as contingent on the other 
as direct results of the individual's active estrangement 
from the Creator God, his acknowledgement of the estrangement, 
and feeling bad about it due to the dissonance between expecta-
tion and performance. 
In the NT, Paul and John present and develop a different 
conception of 
use the word 
the doctrine of sin to that of the OT. They 
hamartia consistently when they are dealing 
with the question of sin. This Greek word denotes missing 
the mark. As such it connotes the OT notions of not living 
or acting according to the will of the Creator God. The 
essence of the Pauline teaching on sin, adduced from his 
extensive writings and thoughts on it, is that Jesus Christ 
alone redeems humankind from the power of sin. Paul argues 
men and women should therefore seek to be followers of Christ, 
who lived according to the will of God, rather than being 
sinners in repudiation of His example. 
that those who oppose Christ commit 
Similarly John argues 
sin. Therefore, John 
asserts, those who do not believe in Him, even those without 
overt opposition, also commit sin. 
The basic Christian conception of sin thus appears to be, 
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in terms of these NT writers, that because of Christ, the 
state of sin is no longer an inevitability. Christians can 
commit sins without necessarily entering into finally and 
unredeemably into a state of sin23 and the condition states 
of dissonance as sinners would engender. 
Gunther (1978) maintains that: 
" the concept of sin - embraces the gamut of human 
failure from the transgression of a single commandment 
to the ruin of one's whole existence. 11 24 
This is correct because, in the worldview of the OT and the 
NT, human failure is measureable in terms of standards deter-
mined by a paradigm of existence which asserts humans are 
created and accountable by and to a Creator God. In Gunther's 
statement, differentiation between particular sins and a 
state of sin can be discerned. These are single commandment 
transgressions and the ruination of one's whole existence, 
respectively. This distinction is what Cook (1986) similarly 
classified as the conscious or accidental contravention of 
particular religious or moral precepts as against the willful 
turning away from God and or Christ.25 
Thus the NT writers never tire of warning about particular 
sins and how these can compound into a total state of sin. 
Sin is as fundamental a fact of human existence for the writers 
of the Old and New Testaments as the fact of the Creation 
is for their worldview. For them sin is essentially human 
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rebelliousness and sins are inadequacies. As such they are 
inevitable elements in human nature. That Christ's role 
is one that deals with these elements points to the Christian 
fundamentals of redemption and forgiveness. These fundamentals 
give the NT part of its significance for the role it has 
played in effectively dealing with the problem of sin and 
sins and their subsequent feelings of dissonance and guilt 
in the lives of many individuals. It also distinguishes 
it from the atonement fundamental of Judaism although this 
fundamental is presumably similarly cognate with psychological 
discourse about mental heal th and well being. The specific 
role the NT plays in individual 'Christian' functioning needs 
further exploration in this regard. 
This exploration is necessary because notions of sin, sins, 
redemption, forgiveness and others from this religion's world 
view enter and remain in individuals' minds as introjects. 
This psychological term introject neatly captures the way 
these notions are present but separated, basically unconscious, 
elements held in the mind. They nevertheless influence the 
individual at a psychological if not religious level. That 
is, many religious concepts are only partially integrated 
into the total experience of the individual. They often 
remain split-off, unintegrated, vicariously experienced, 
heard-about-entities, which remain in the mind purely as 
introjects. 
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This is perhaps due to the nature of the paradigm of the 
Christian religion.26 It asserts that there is an inevitable 
gulf between the Creator God and the individual who will 
only know, through faith, certain things and only at certain 
levels. That is, as Kierkegaard argued, feelings remain 
primary dynamics in religious experience. Cognitive assurances 
are at best marginally achieved through leaps of faith.27 
This is not to disparage the faith networks of any believer's 
mind. The point is that feeling bad and feeling guilty, 
for example, can invariably be more real and living experiences 
than feeling absolutely sure about one's redemption and for-
giveness. 
Understanding how and why individuals feel anything at all 
about their performances and feelings in reference to a Creator 
God, whom others have argued has set the limits of and for 
human behaviour, means consideration must be given to exploring 
and explaining the Biblical conception of the inner environment 
of the individual conscience is perceived to be. This is 
t o establish a little more accurately how and why individuals 
will or will not feel guilty or forgiven and have other feel-
ings about 'sin.' 
There is no overt voice of conscience or similar concept 
to it in terms of its present day formulation in the OT. 
This is because in the OT the problem of the individual' s 
attitude towards him or herself was of far less significance 
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than that of attitudes toward God and others. In the LXX 
the Greek word for conscience, syneidesis, is used to indicate 
the prosecutor and judge function occurring within a person. 
Maurer ( 1978), however, points out that this is in Wisdom 17 
: 11 where a bad conscience is spoken about in a purely ethical 
sense. 28 In the Hebrew OT the word leb is used only once 
to explain David's bothering conscience ( I Samuel 24 : 5). 
The term conscience, in its more general psychological parlance 
was not a concept term familiar to the OT world. It entered 
into Biblical thought in NT times. 
3.3 
THE NEW TESTAMENT AND CONSCIENCE 
In the NT the Greek noun syneidesis occurs some 3 0 times. 
In the Gospels it occurs only in John's account of the accusers 
of the woman taken in adultery. He writes that they were 
immobilized when "convicted by their own consciences" (John 8 : 
9). Apart 
(I Peter 2 
(Acts 23 
from three instances that it is 
19, 3 : 16; and 3 : 21) and 
l; 24 : 16), all usage is by Paul. 
used by Peter 
twice in Acts 
It is apparent 
therefore that even if Paul did not actually introduce the 
word into Christian thought, as Pierce (1958) argues he did, 
Paul certainly used it to make plain its nature and role 
in the functioning of the Christian individua1.29 
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In his book Conscience in the New Testament, Pierce30 works 
from the conclusion that the word syneidesis refers to feeling 
the pain that is felt when something considered wrong was 
done. Pierce argues that as an everyday word during NT times 
it adequately represented the concept of consciousness within 
the individual which reviewed, and felt, the moral quality 
of actions. It referred to a specific element in human nature, 
and it was that which was concerned with the moral quality 
of one's own specific past acts and how these related to 
one's character as a whole. These resultant feelings invariab-
ly functioned as pain. 
Pierce argues the conscience inflicted, felt and was the 
crippling and disabling pain. He uses Philo's description 
to show how all three aspects of conscience are a part of 
it as a whole entity within the individual. Philo' s own 
words once again best explain: 
" It is born with every soul and makes its abode 
with it, nor is it wont to admit therein anything that 
offends. Its property is ever to hate the evil and 
love the good. This same thing is at once accuser and 
judge. When once stirred up, as accuser lays charge, 
it makes accusation, it puts to shame: then again as 
judge it teaches, warns, counsels the soul to repent. 
If its suasions but prevail, joyfully it is reconciled. 
But if it cannot prevail, it gives not peace, but makes 
war. Never does it depart by day or by night, but it 
stabs as with a goad, and inflicts wounds that know 
no healing, until it sna_12s the thread of that soul's 
pitiful and accursed live.3l 
Clearly this description aptly captures the nature and effects 
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of conscience as it affects the individual's sense of well-
being. It also points to the nature of the understanding 
of conscience that has filled lives and events throughout 
the history of the Christian religion if Pierce is correct 
in identifying this as the sense of the word that Paul em-
ployed. 
Looking at Paul's use of the word conscience, Pierce shows 
how he needed to use it in a world that was affected by Greek 
constructs and a world that had individuals in it who demanded 
and needed a better understanding of their inner environments. 
They sought self-knowledge about the way that they functioned 
as humans, questioning their mode of existence, and belief 
systems. Thus it was that Paul, through his skills in communi-
cating the Gospel message, identified and clarified the func-
tion of the conscience. He showed its role in the functioning 
of the individual, and how it can assist or thwart Christ-
ian living. In short, Paul showed how the conscience related 
to a sense of Christian well-being. 
An examinati9n of one of the times that Paul uses the word 
syneidesis as conscience illustrates this. In I Corinthians, 
10, in dealing with the question of eating meats sacrificed 
to idols, Paul shows how conscience depends on knowledge 
to function properly and effectively. He argues that the 
conscience is only a part of the individual's moral faculty. 
I t works in a basically negative way by functioning only 
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when something wrong has been done and it is known that wrong 
has been done. 32 Hence when the Christian' s sense of indi-
vidual well-being is subjected to doubts and the possibility 
of wrongdoing, Paul shows how the mechanism of conscience 
initiates and enables the individual to identify and ideally 
to deal appropriately with any internal feelings of dissonance. 
From Paul's use of the word, it appears that he considered 
the conscience to be both the sense of pain and the instrument 
whereby the individual felt the pain when a religious law 
or precept was transgressed. It is therefore, that unit 
of moral consciousness which discerns the moral quality of 
actions, values and situations in terms of their will-of-God 
content. The conscience creates a sense of dissonance within 
the individual which has to be resolved if the individual 
is to experience and to achieve a sense of harmony and well-
being. 
Pierce usefully explains that the pain of a dissonating con-
science can best be conceptualized as the guilt which is 
felt when shame and fear combine. This is apparent in the 
nature of nonlegalistic guilt which Pierce explains as being: 
" internally effective whether it be externally de-
clared or not, (and) is a phenomenon familiar to modern 
psychopathology. It is only too rightly called a disease 
and he who suffers from it can truly never be happy 
33 
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The unhappiness results from feelings of discomfort and dis-
sonance related to feelings of culpability for wrong doing, 
which, activated in and by the conscience, causes feelings 
of guilt. 
This condition appears to be particularly prevalent for indi-
viduals who accept and acknowledge a religion paradigm of 
creatureliness and obligation. For the Christian, the con-
science is an especially important and active faculty of 
the individual. This is because, again as explained by Pierce, 
in the NT, "Conscience is the reaction of the whole man to 
his own wrong acts" and is "but one, the moral, of the re-
actions of the nature of man as delimited by creation. 11 34 
As the sourcebook of the religion, the NT and its conception 
of the conscience formulates and maintains this conception 
of and for the individual and the functions of conscience. 
Consequently, the NT conceptions of guilt and conscience 
as indices of sin and sins marks a significant development 
in the history of ideas. This has shown the way that sin, 
sins and guilt are invariably contiguous as introjected feel-




It is because the individual is considered to be a creature 
in this Biblical Christian conception of humankind that the 
possible consequences of the risk to err, against the Will 
of the Creator God, becomes an issue. That is, the notion 
of creatureliness establishes a particular ideal symbiosis 
with contraventions and obligations establishing particular 
conditions. 
These conditions initiate the concepts of sin and sins which, 
although varying in parameters from OT to NT times, essentially 
refer to the creatures' defaults. The defaults in this overall 
paradigm are seen as involving consequence, and penalty marks 
their significance. Moreover, that the individual can ex-
perience dissonance in this regard, and can feel guilty about 
thoughts and actions, with reference to the ideals and expecta-
tions of faultlessness, marks the implications of the defaults. 
The implications of the penalty of sin are threefold. It 
is alienation from the Creator and the possibility of progres-
sive deterioration of character. It also profoundly affects 
the sense of well-being which has implications for mental 
health. Notions of sin, guilt and punishment are tied up 
with notions of the need therefore for wholeness, forgiveness 
and redemption to effect this state of mental health. Dif-
ferent answers to the manifestations of these needs have 
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been formulated by the OT, NT and psychology writers as they 
search for the ways and means to negate the consequences 
and the penalty of the sense of sin. 
The Christian Biblical conception and norms of mental heal th 
thus affect the nature and effect of its fundamental conception 
of things. These function as introjects in the minds of 
those within and out of the orbit of the religion's influence. 
Based in the writings of the Scripture with the attendant 
implications of Scriptural Authority makes this Holy Writ 
about the status of the individual important in a great many 
lives, directly and indirectly. 
The impact of the notion of a conscience on the mental health 
of a Christian is therefore important to consider in the 
therapeutic situation. That the introduction of the term 
conscience may have created its function 
It's effects and implications appear to 
nature, integral parts of being human. 
is a non-question. 
be, by their very 
This is because it 
can be concluded that the primary function of the conscience 
is inherently a human faculty. As an internally held set 
of moral convictions derived from socio-religious precepts 
and teachings, it would appear that all persons sharing the 
same socio-religious paradigmatic conception of things would 
in effect have the similar functions of conscience as presented 
above in Chapter One and experience dissonance when drives, 
needs or goals conflict. 
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Accordingly, it is important to see the Biblical Conception 
as a major conception of the way individuals do live and 
feel they ought to live and this establishes a particular 
situation in ·which feelings of guilt are brought about. That 
it differs as a realm of discourse in the language it uses 
and the assumptions it holds ~bout the individual, but shares 
with psychological discourse concerns for mental health and 
reducing dissonance, means that the two realms of discourse 




A COMMON DISCOURSE FOR DEALING WITH THE DISSONANCE OF GUILT 
Despite a shared interest in the human condition, confusion 
between methodology and terminology has meant psychology 
and religion appear to disagree .1 Regretably this confusion 
has been responsible for aggravating mental ill heal th where 
this aggravation may well have been avoided.2 
Both realms of discourse have tended to focus on the negative 
possibilities of the other. Consequently they have not always 
considered any usefulness the other may have. A comparison 
of Sigmund Freud's and Carl Jung's approaches verifies this. 
The former advocated that religion was symptomatic of neurosis 
whilst the latter advocated that religion played a vital 




therapeutic process of integration. 3 Moreover, 
denigrate psychology because it denies the 
many fundamental beliefs and practices of 
Pastoral Psychology attempts to reconsider the human condition 
and amalgamate its psychological and religious components.4 
This attempt and need for amalgamation is a Western phenomena. 
In Eastern traditions, religion and psychology never separated 
the way they have in the West.5 Hence amalgamation is neces-
sary only where such separation in thought and language has 
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occurred. 
This chapter will consider how the realms of psychology and 
religion can, despite their inherent diversity in Western 
they can be better understood tradition, be amalgamated 
and used by the other. 
so 
This involves translating the sense 
and significance of their different approaches. 
Accordingly, the chapter is in three parts. The first briefly 
explains what religion and psychology are and identifies 
points of translation they share in terms of mental health 
care. Second, their particular terms for dealing with the 
dissonance of guilt feelings will be presented with particular 
reference to the assumptions, procedures, and implications 
of confession and psychoanalysis with suggested re-definitions 
of some key words. The third part will suggest a new framework 
of approach for dealing with the dissonance of guilt feelings 
that refers to the discourses of psychology and religion. 
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4.1 
PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION: POINTS OF TRANSLATION 
Psychology aims to systematically study and scientifically 
describe human behaviour. 6 It does so with particular focus 
on the human mind, and the ways in which the mind affects 
an individual's experience, and present condition. Psychology 
in this sense is basically biography. It aims to show how 
individual experience is determined by forces within and 
without the individual's inner life. 
This aim of psychology is a vast enterprise. Different branch-
es of psychology have developed specific concerns about certain 
aspects of the enterprise. One branch, the aspect this thesis 
refers to, seeks to account for and differentiate between 
biographies of mentally heal thy and mentally unhealthy indi-
viduals. This is the psychology of psychopathology, or ab-
normal psychology.7 It is primarily concerned with personality 
disorders, debilitating reactions of mental and emotional 
sickness, neuroses and psychoses. 
The need for treatment of mental and emotional disorders 
has developed the psychological discipline of psychotherapy.a 
This discipline operates on the basis of inter-personal commu-
nication between psychotherapist and patient. The purpose 
of the communication is ostensively the patient's relief 
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from disorder. The psychotherapist, a trained psychologist 
in a particular method of psychotherapy, uses specialized 
theoretical and practical knowledge to enable the patient 
to express feelings, overcome inhibitions, identify and own 
weaknesses and acquire effective coping strategies so as 
to facilitate the patient's mental health. 
The appelation of disorder to certain felt and exhibited 
thoughts and behaviours is contingent on the notion that 
there is an order to which the disorder contrasts.9 The 
notion of order obviously effects the ways that individuals, 
as patients, psychotherapists or others, think about themselves 
and other people as they arrange and evaluate their thoughts 
and activities. Any conception of normality tends to become 
reified. It consequently becomes something to which indi-
viduals refer themselves and, in their evaluations, can come 
to view themselves or others as deviants. 
Guilt feelings and other feelings of dissonance result when 
individuals recognise and acknowledge that they have been 
deviant and feel uncomfortable and responsible about it. 
These feelings can have positive or negative effects. In 
the former, the person takes appropriate action to allay 
and effectively dispense with the feelings. In the latter, 
appropriate action is not taken. Instead, the feelings become 
debilitating. They subsequently engender other and more 
serious effects in mental and emotional functioning.10 
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Here the task of the psychotherapist is evident. The therapist 
assists the patient with removing debilitating feelings and 
behaviour. These need to be replaced with appropriate means 
of functioning so that the patient will feel contented and 
experience no undue dissonance. This replacement is done 
within one of the two variations in the psychotherapeutic 
task. The first is that which the Freudian psychoanalytic 
method exemplifies.11 
deeply rooted faults 
It seeks the alteration of unconscious, 
in thoughts and behaviours. In this 
method, the patient's repressed, unconscious mental life 
is analyzed so that more effective coping strategies may 
replace the debilitating organization of the patient's person-
ality which had been brought about by inappropriate defense 
mechanisms and repressed materia1.12 
The second variation of psychotherapy deals more exclusively 
with the patient's conscious symptoms and problems. Techniques 
that give the patient reassurance, support and guidance are 
used. Any underlying, unconscious psychopathology is not 
directly dealt with. Instead, the therapist concentrates 
on the patient's cognizant strengths and weaknesses with 
the goal of building strengths and coping realistically with 
weaknesses. Rational-Emotive Therapy, Reality Therapy, In-
tegrity Therapy and Transactional Analysis are methods exempli-
fying this approach.13 
These latter methods of psychotherapy are more reparative 
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than reconstructive in purpose and method. They are different 
to the first variation in this respect. Prior to the develop-
ment and growth of psychodynamic therapy, the functions of 
the reparative psychotherapist were administered by the clergy. 
That is, before developments in psychoanalysis and modern-day 
secularization, individual's generally sought and received 
counselling help from their priest, rabbi or minister. Clergy-
men, in their role as persons ordained for religious service, 
had functions of advising, guiding and counselling. Having 
this role meant they did the work of psychotherapists referring 
to their own religious convictions, not psychoanalytical 
theory. 
The role religion and religionists still play in mental health 
is a complex issue to explain because defining religion is 
itself problematic and contentious.14 Consequently there 
is much obscurity about what is and what is not religious. 
Nevertheless, major world religions and their adherents are 
identifiable as are their essential principles and features. 
The nature and implications of these principles influences 
the lifestyles of the adherents. Studies of religion, the 
psychology of religion and psychology in general attempt 
to account for these influences and their effects.ls 
The Biblical Christian conception of the psychology of the 
individual has been shown to have certain influences and 
effects ( Chapter Three) • That drives and goals involve the 
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generation of states of dissonance· within the individual 
which can be debilitating, has also been indicated ( Chapter 
One). It is important to recall that removal of dissonance 
is the goal of reparative and reconstructive psychotherapy. 
It therefore seems that psychology and religion have a common 
meeting ground in the issues pertaining to mental health 
and its permutations. 
POINTS OF TRANSLATION 
That psychology and religion share an interest in the procure-
ment and maintenance of mental health suggests assessment 
of their assumptions and methodologies will indicate points 
where translation between their respective discourses could 
occur. Seven points of translation may be identified. 
( 1) MENTAL HEALTH CONSONANCE AND HARMONY 
Both psychotherapy and religious discourses aim for individuals 
to attain and maintain a sense of well-being in their inner 
environment because the sense of well-being is viewed as 
necessary for appropriate, effective functioning. With a 
sense of well-being, the individual experiences and expresses 
no conflicting states of dissonance, either causing mildly 
debilitatory feelings, such as discontent and unhappiness, 
or severely debilitating feelings and convictions, such as 
self-worthlessness and personality disorders.16 Thus, for 
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example, psychoanalysis aims to facilitate effective ego 
functioning whilst Christianity aims for life without sin. 
(2) MODELS 
In both discourses some notion of an ideal individual is 
advocated as the model to which others are compared and to 
which individuals compare themselves. In Christianity the 
model of Jesus Christ is propounded. Other religions explicit-
ly or implicitly formulate their conception of the ideal 
individua1.17 For example, in Judaism the righteous individual 
is revered whilst in Hinduism it is the ascetic.18 
In Freud's theory, the ideal individual would be one free 
from neurosis and be a person in which the id, ego and superego 
functioned harmoniously.19 In psychotherapy generally the 
ideal is thus construed as the individual who is without 
debilitating disorders that would otherwise impede appropriate 
functioning and coping. Interestingly, the ideal is not 
formalized explicitly and no absolute is sought. This is 
evident in the discipline's attempt to define the abnormal. 
Guidelines are offered and categories have been isolated. 
No absolute definition to encompass all individuals is seen 
as possible or desirable because of the varieties of individual 
experience and the dangers of proscriptive terminology. 
Nevertheless, working definitions and labels are, of necessity, 
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used. The DSM III (1984) is currently a common reference 
work in this regard.20 
(3) THE INDIVIDUAL 
In both psychology and religion the afflicted, troubled indi-
vidual has to invest energy, 
the enterprise of attaining 




time and interest into 
health. That is, the 
goal that appears to 
be better than the condition of mental health, and to continue 
to make the effort to work towards fulfilling this goal of 
mental health. In Christianity this is explicitly an ongoing 
effort of living as a Christian despite contrary impulses, 
opportunities and attractions. In psychotherapeutic terms 
this can mean continuing to consult a therapist and to imple-
ment the advice given so that maladaptive behaviours are 
adjusted and the inevitable difficulties and challenges of 
life are appropriately responded to. 
(4) HONEST VERBALIZATION 
In confession and psychoanalysis the penitent or the patient 
has to verbalize innermost feelings and thoughts. 21 Honesty 
is essential. Any dishonesty obfuscates the issue and will 
not facilitate a resolution of the problematic present con-
dition. 
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(5) THE LISTENER 
The role of the spiritual or psyche guide is another common 
feature. That some are more adept and specially trained 
for dealing with certain aspects and maladies is evident 
in differing roles and functions of psychoanalyst and priest. 
Nevertheless, the person who listens to the afflicted indi-
vidual basically has to establish and maintain suitable rapport 
if effective communication is to take place. 
The psychotherapeutic concept and eventuality of transference 
and the trust necessary in the Christian confessional are 
essential components for communication in their respective 
processes. Such components are not automatic. They generally 
depend on the skills of the listener. Psychology has certainly 
assisted in refining and developing these skills.22 
The psychologicalization of pastoral care has meant that 
many clergymen are trained for dealing with the more severe 
psycho-pathologies. Similarly, some psychotherapists are 
committed to particular religions. This means that in certain 
instances patients do receive a more holistic treatment from 
their listener. A few clergymen and therapists do the op-
posite. They refrain from using the other realm of discourse 
or disdain it openly. Thus, in some cases negative attitudes 
towards the other discourse, and what it represents, can 
be responsible for perpetuating problems that could otherwise 
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perhaps be better dealt with. 
{ 6) DISSONANCE AND CONSCIENCE 
The ways and the extent that feelings of dissonance and work-
ings of the conscience are interrelated has been presented 
above ( Chapter One). Their relationship does not imply that 
they are the same thing. A distinction needs to be made 
between them. This is because the conscience, although feeling 
the dissonance, is also the mechanism whereby the feelings 
of dissonance are evaluated and judged. Psychotherapy has 
tended to deny and neglect the additional aspect and function 
of the conscience. Consequently, the religious usefulness 
of the conscience in ensuring ethical obligations are met 
has not always been considered by psychotherapists with the 
result that the workings of the conscience are not always 
treated in psychotherapy. 
This denial and neglect has occurred because psychotherapists 
have incorrectly equated the superego with the functions 
of the conscience. As the psychodynamic construct of sociali-
zation which does not explicitly consider religious dynamics, 
the superego needs to be seen as different in both role and 
function to the conscience. The former addresses conflicting 
feelings with a view to their particular implications. The 
latter does this too, but also evalutes the implications 
in terms of what they indicate about the whole person. It 
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t hus feels and brings to consciousness the dissonance that 
t he superego identifies.23 
(7) SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Psychological and religious discourses are concerned with 
the individual' s role as a social being. Despite the change 
i n Christianity's emphasis on the individual's personal 
responsibility and accountability in the New Testament 
conception, in contrast to the more community emphasis of 




Christian community principles. 
implications of psychopathologies 




They are used as the measure against which the individual's 
functioning is compared. 
These points of translation indicate that psychology and 
religion do share common methods and interests in the realm 
of mental health. They denote a larger common concern with 
adjustment and personal growth. However, they use differing 
terms and concepts for describing and achieving their aims. 
Closer examination of their conceptual vocabularies reveals 
t hat psychology and religion invariably ref er to the notions 
of the other, albeit implicitly or indirectly. This suggests 
a basis for a common discourse that could be better articulated 
and more effectively used. 
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4.2 
TERMS FOR A COMMON DISCOURSE 
An examination of confession and psychoanalysis reveals that 
some terms and concepts in each have generic meaning for 
both. This is because both discourses originate and function 
in a Western paradigm. This paradigm allows the development 
of particular patterns of thought like Christianity and Depth 
Psychology. They both address the human condition within 
certain paradigmatic possiblities which necessarily share 
similar basic assumptions. Permutations of these assumptions 
result in apparently disparate approaches, such as psycho-
analysis and confession, that nevertheless are essentially 
concerned with individuals and their present condition. 
The approach of psychoanalysis as a method of treatment for 
mental ill health involves five permutated assumptions about 
the human condition derived in principle from Freud's theory.24 
These are used to evaluate the individual and what needs 
to be done about the present condition. The approach of 
the Christian Confessional as a method of ensuring spiritual, 
mental health involves three other permutated assumptions 
derived from the Biblical Christian concept of things. 
The first assumption of psychoanalysis is that some mental 
processes are unconscious and operate outside the individual's 
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consciousness. The processes nevertheless play a significant 
part in the individual's psychic life and can affect behaviour. 
These processes can be responsible for neurotic, debilitating 
thoughts and behaviours which relates to the second assumption 
that thoughts and behaviours have psychological significance. 
This significance is seen as being due to their inevitable 
psychic determinants, including those at unconscious levels. 
The third assumption is psychic determinants are responsible 
for determining behaviour. Once identified and understood, 
they invariably will explain behaviour because individuals 
function according to goal achievement which motivates be-
haviour. That motivation is geared towards the overall 
development of the individual is the fourth assumption. This 
development occurs as the individual accumulates and responds 
to exper,i.ence and becomes an autonomous well-adjusted adult, 
who behaves and thinks appropriately. 
The fifth assumption acknowledges that not all individuals 
become such a kind of adult. Deviations are systematically 
identified so they can be helped. Deviants are thus enabled 
to attain some measure of normality and order. In this regard 
the role of the psychotherapist is formulated. Their special 
training facilitates the patient's appropriate adjustment 
and personal growth. This adjustment and growth is achieved 
by restoring consonance and harmony to the inner environment, 
establishing a sense and an expression of well-being through 
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t he chosen method of therapy. 
The assumptions in the process of Christian Confession relate 
to the Biblical conception of the individual as a creature 
with specific obligations. 25 There are three basic assump-
tions. The first is that individuals are sinful creatures 
that need to be forgiven by the Creator God. The second 
is that as Creator, God alone can and will forgive sins if 
the sinner sincerely seeks this. The third is that Christ 
came to redeem sinners and His apostles and their successors 
can remit sins as He instructed them to.26 
Confession works 
analysis. Both 
in Christianity in similar ways to psycho-
involve an individual talking to another 
as a means for attaining relief from their troubling state 
of mind. In Christianity the troubling state involves the 
default of ethical obligations. Thus in Christian confession, 
the individual verbalizes the feelings, thoughts and actions 
t hey know are contraventions of God's Will. This is in res-
ponse to the scriptural injunction found in James 5:16, which 
reiterates the advice given in Proverbs 28:13. These are 
'Therefore confess your sins to one another that you 
may be healed' and 
not prosper, but 
'He who conceals his transgressions will 
he who confesses and forsakes them will 
obtain mercy,' respectively. 
Roman Catholic Church confession consists of three phases. 
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These are contrition, confession and absolution. The three 
phases of the ritual of confession take the penitent out 
of the experience of dissonance to an acceptance of obligation 
and restoration of harmony. In the first phase individuals 
examine their consciences, vis-a-vis their ethical obligations 
and defaults which constitute sins. In the second phase, 
individuals, sincerely sorry for their sins, confess them, 
followed by a resolution to make amends by not sinning again. 
Finally, in the third phase, the Priest assigns a penance 
to be done in reparation, restitution or punishment for the 
sins. The process of confession, assignment of penance and 
absolution ends with the confessor reciting the Act of Con-
trition whilst the Priest gives Absolution (see Appendix C). 
Confession is thus the admission individuals make to priests 
of sins committed with the purpose of receiving absolution 
for them from the priest. This procedure, correctly called 
the Sacrament of Penance, is sought when an individual has 
thought or behaved contrary to the Will of God. Confession 
of such contraventions is seen as necessary for receiving 
God's forgiveness. This is based on the scriptural injunction 
in I John 1 ff: 
the blood of Jesus cleanses us from all sin. If 
we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the 
truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faith-
ful and just and will forgive our sins and cleanse us 
from all unrighteousness. If we say we have not sinned, 
we make him a liar and his word is not in us.' 
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This was a notion inherited from Judaism wherein the Day 
of Atonement is seen as an open confession of sins committed 
against others and God (Appendix D).27 Jesus himself propound-
ed the practice as exemplified in the Lord's Prayer 
( Luke 11: 2ff}. The practice, of open confession was formalized 
by the Catholic Church in the 6th Century as a sacrament. 
Stott ( 197 4} has argued that the sacrament is based on the 
doctrine of Catholic priesthood which arises out of and depends 
on Catholicism's views on absolution.28 As Ludwig Ott (1970) 
states, priestly absolution "does not merely indicate 
forgiveness of sins, but also effects it ... 29 This priestly 
effect means that priests are seen as having an integral 
role in actually forgiving sins on behalf of God by providing 
sinners with the means for obtaining His forgiveness. 
Sin is thus viewed in a similar vein by psychotherapists 
and those who listen to Christian confessions. In religious 
discourse, sin is offence against God, a denial of His love 
and a choice to not fulfil obligations towards His expecta-
tions. It involves discord between the individual and God 
and between the individual and their community. In either 
situation, the discord initiates feelings of disharmony and 
dissonance in the individual who feels uncomfortable about 
their rebellion. 
In psychological discourse such notions of sin can be equated 
with the subjective cognitions individuals hold about their 
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personal, social defaults and breaches of norms. These also 
i nitiate feelings of discord, affecting interpersonal and 
intrapersonal relationships. This equation means that although 
psychology disavows the religious connotations of the concept 
and term sin, it does address the feelings, process and impli-
cations that the word refers to within the parameters of 
the concept of dissonance. 
This synonymity is because whether sin is construed as turning 
away from God or breaching social 
of discord and culpability, the 
norms and feeling a sense 
result in either case is 
due to egocentrism. As such, the state of sin or discord 
is a debilitating state of mind. It is due to consciousness 
of sins and social shortcomings corrupting and impairing 
the individual. These detrimentally affect social relation-
ships, self-esteem and subsequent mental and emotional 
functioning. 
Despite this contiguity in psychological and religious con-
ceptions of sin, further extrapolations of similarities are 
not so easily discernible. This difficulty is evident when 
their views on the motivations, implications and justifications 
of sin are considered. The effects of Twentieth Century 
secularization and its precursor, the Protestant Reformation 
in the Sixteenth Century have been responsible for this. 30 
The latter process undermined the Roman Catholic Church's 
position on the implications and nature of sin as well as 
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the role of the Priest in dealing with it. This undermining 
basically meant that individuals no longer went to Confession 
as a matter of course. They could choose not to go. 
With the option of confessing of not, individuals were able 
to judge themselves and their sinfulness in a different way. 
Inevitably this resulted in strategies to lessen self-judgments 
of responsibility and culpability. That these strategies 
do not always totally negate reasons for feeling dissonance 
is evident in that feelings of guilt and dissonance continue. 
This continuation is due to the operations of the conscience 
and the superego, which, although susceptible to the counter 
measures of these strategies, nevertheless function in terms 





to lessen self-judgements of 
can be identified.31 Three 
responsibility 
are conducive 
to reducing dissonance and its possible detrimental effects, 
the other three can be seriously debilitating. The first 
in the former group is the strategy advocating the notion 
that sins are inevitable. The argument is that just as Adam 
was predestined to sin, so all people were. Sin is simply 
part of the human condition. Consequently, this view suggests, 
efforts to prevent sin or to seek forgiveness for them are 
wasted. It is best to simply accept them and get on with 
living. 
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The second strategy is the argument that sins need not be 
taken seriously because humans, created in the image of God, 
are not accountable. Individuals, in their assumed godlike-
ness thus believe they are permitted to do anything they 
please without fear of consequence. The third strategy argues 
that reasoning about sins is morbid and consequently corruptive 
and destructive in its effects on the individual. The argument 
is thus that individuals should instead simply seek to adopt 
more rational evaluatory procedures when considering their 
personal socio-religious defaults. 
The first strategy that seeks to reduce responsibility and 
culpability, but invariably leads to more debilitating conse-
quences is based on the notion that sin can be avoided. This 
idea can become a lifestyle that is neurotic and 
self-destroying. In it, all actions and thoughts become 
puritanically evaluated with all possibilities surveyed with 
incessant and unrealistic control. Threat of punishment 
forms another approach and has the effect of preventing sin 
being committed. However, because prevention in action does 
not necessarily include negation of concomitant thoughts 
and desires, individuals can experience discord and dissonance 
when actions are incongruent with feelings. Finally, the 
strategy of asserting one is without sin, or that sin is 
a meaningless concept, 
accountable to no-one. 
be a valid and mature 
allows the individual to feel 
Al though in some instances this may 
assessment, it is oftentimes related 
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to sociopathic and psychopathic tendencies and disorders.32 
Further comparison of confession and psychoanalysis reveals 
that despite differences, a convergence of interests, methods 
and purposes can be discerned. In both, the basic aim is 
to enable the individual to function optimally in their inner 
environment. In psychotherapeutic parlance, this environment 
is primarily the inner environment which includes the social 
environment impinged on to it by the ambient community. In 
the language of confession, the social community and the 
inner environment includes God and aspects of His Trinity 
as principal members. 
Despite this difference of including or not including God, 
both aim at the basic restoration of the individual within 
so that optimal functioning is achieved. They also share 
certain other features to do this. One is that the confession-
al and the psychotherapy session follow and implement certain 
procedures. The Catholic confession, as the Sacrament of 
Penance, has a universal format. Psychotherapists do not 
have such a format. Nevertheless, they contain their efforts 
within certain ethical limitations. These ethical limitations 
constitute as ethical format which ensures patients' needs 
are inviolate.33 
Both psychotherapists and clergymen view sin as something 
which makes people unhappy, discontented and in a state of 
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dissonance. This second agreement indicates that both consider 
sin as an integral component of the dissonance process. 
Psychology argues that the dissonance is a result of discordant 
compulsions. Religion argues it is due to wrong choices. 
These arguments confirm that both are concerned with the 
resultant dissonance. Hence, intentionality and its con-
comitant egocentrism, can be equated with conscious causes 
of dissonance and its evaluation as sin because both discourses 
see the (sinful) external act as result and cause. Consequent-
ly, sin and its egocentrism is considered by both to be a 
cause and a result of the individual's inability to cope 
appropriately with the demands and influences of the human 
condition. 











assist the individual towards 
feeling better about themselves. They do so by giving the 
individual a semblance of forgiveness and order through the 
implicit and indirect consequences of the therapy session 
or confession. 
Psychoanalysis and confession have some substantial differences 
nevertheless. Firstly, psychoanalysis is not overtly concerned 
with the morality of the problem. It is concerned with the 
problem's propriety in terms of normality and the effects 
it has on the individual. The confessional and clergymen 
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are overtly concerned with religious morality, religiously 
defined norms of behaviour and ethical obligations. 
• 
Secondly, confession is concerned with willful, conscious 
misdeeds and thoughts that are deemed contrary to Christian 
standards. Psychotherapeutic psychoanalysis is concerned 
with unknown, unconscious motivations and how and why these 
have affected consciousness. These different concerns mean 
that there are fundamental differences in the way that the 
patient or penitent is approached. The former is invariably 
deemed less culpable and accountable than the latter. 
Nevertheless, the confessional dyad's religious framework 
distinguishes it from the therapist-patient situation only 
in so far as religious issues can be distinguished from psycho-
logical issues. Both involve openness, honesty and letting 
someone else know exactly what is being felt and experienced. 
They use different assumptions, however, and refer to different 
conceptions to effect this open disclosure. 
Psychoanalysts subscribing to Freud's assumptions about per-
sonality functioning, base their approach to effecting restora-
tion on certain concepts of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. 
This approach thus includes the general psychodynamic concep-
tion of personality functioning, its implications of uncon-
scious motivation and ego defense mechanisms. These psychody-
namic constructs determine the particular mode of therapy 
called psychoanalysis. 
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This mode of therapy is an analytic one and depends on insight 
to obtain material and be effective because patients invariably 
do not fully understand something about themselves. The 
psychoanalyst has to find out what this is and why it is 
debilitative. Accordingly, in psychoanalysis, the psychothera-
pist interprets the individual's motivations to reveal the 
deeper roots of any psychological or emotional problem. 
Insights, by the therapists or the patient, achieved through 
such interpretation and revelation, are presumed to assist 
the movement of psychic material from inaccessible and un-
conscious levels to conscious levels.34 Through this 
consciousness raising, the unconscious is made conscious. 
This invariably relieves individuals from their inner 
dissonance that had debilitating cognitive and psychodynamic 
causes and effects. 
In doing so, psychoanalysis fulfils some of the functions 
of religion. It gives the individual reasons for living, 
a sense of purpose, belonging and meaning and does so by 
answering existential crises in an appropriate way. That 
is, just as religious faith works to restore and maintain 
mental health by giving meaning and purpose to life, so psycho-
logical terminology operates to give the troubled individual 
a sense of mental health. 
Making psychology more cognizant of the role that religions 
ought to and can fulfil in effecting mental health in a 
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secularized world has been sanctioned by several writers. 34 
They all basically argue for psychological discourse to be 
cognizant of religion's contributions and implications so 
that the positive role it can play in personal mental health 
can be facilitated and maintained. 
The complementary process of psychologicalizing religious 
discourse also needs to take place. Here the scientific 
knowledge of psychology can usefully benefit effectiveness 
of expression and appropriateness of treatment. To effect 
these processes of translation, words from each discourse 
need be explored and explained with reference to the other 
so that, where possible, words are used and understood cor-
rectly. Otherwise, they will continue to be used and under-
stood imprecisely and obscurely with implications and influence 
for mental health care obfuscated and confused. 
The table below presents some of the words that invariably 
function as obfuscated introjects in the minds of therapist, 
patient and others. The alternative definitions are suggested 
as a means for bringing about some clarity. This redefinition 
is not to propose that the theoretical or doctrinal implica-
tions of the original words be totally disregarded. This 
reformulation attempts to translate the unclear into a more 
functional framework, so that re-theologizing and psycholo-
gizing pastoral care and mental care is done in a way that 











The process of talking through, with 
total honesty, feelings, ideas, and 
memories that constitute everything 
that makes the person feel the way 
they do at the present time and is 
causing dissonance and discomfort. 
The regulative mechanism censoring 
the individual's thoughts and 
actions from within by identifying, 
constituting and feeling the pain 
and discomfort felt when norms are 
breached, obligations not met and 
expectations unfulfilled. 
Feelings of discomfort, often 
leading to feelings of guilt ini-
tiated by remorse and regret, 
brought about by contrary cogni-
tions. This occurs when beliefs 
are incongruent with actions or 
when beliefs conflict with other 
beliefs, held by the same individual. 
Broadly speaking, being ill-at-
ease with one's self and within 
one's self due to feelings of 
regret and remorse about actions 
and thoughts, contrary to the ex-
pected, normal or beneficial. 
These are due to feelings of 
dissonance which can lead to con-
structive or destructive responses. 
Therapy of psychic difficulties 
and problems using certain theo-
retical methodologies and con-
ceptions of the causes and means 
of resolving such debilitating 
entities. Involves a therapist 
and the talking through of dif-
ficulties with consciousness 
raising, mutual rapport and under-
standing facilitating the patient's 
restoration with the guidance and 
expertize of the listener-therapist. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 
To facilitate honesty to use the insights 
of the confessional procedure so to ac-
count for the presenting problem and 
identify and initiate a means of treat-
ment for their resolution. 
To differentiate the effects of the 
conscience from the effects of an over-
scrupulous superego so that the neces-
sary stringency of moral behaviour is 
maintained and that the religious dynami cs. 
of the mechanism ensure hannony, conson-
nance and ethical behaviour. 
To distinguish between psychodynamic 
dissonance and cognitive dissonance so 
that causes and effects can be estab-
lished and dealt with effectively. 
To establish the cause and level of 
feelings of guilt and to restore conson-
nance through the negation of the dis-
sonance by the most effective strategies. 
This involves primarily raising to cogni-
tive consciousness the reasons and extent 
of the feelings so that the patient can 
co-author the healing process. 
To be cognizant of the totality of 
individuals and their needs for inner 
environment consonance and hannony and 
that the history of the cure of souls 
indicates the necessary cognizance of 





The realization that restitution has 
been brought about and that sinful 
actions have been negated appro-
priately. That Christianity advo-
cates Christ as the Redeemer never-
theless still requires Christians to 
redeem themselves by living accord-
ing to Christian principles. This 
is synonymous with the reasoning and 
results of Salvation and Healing 
through forgiveness. 
A particular traditional, shared set 
of beliefs about life and living that 
shape experience and life-styles and 
thereby function to give individuals 
a sense of belonging and meaning and 
a means of explaining existence. 
Salvation Healing These two words need to be seen as 
synonymous as both refer to the 
condition of well-being brought 
about within the individual when he 
feels restored, forgiven or mentally 
healthy. That is, both words refer 
to the same condition of wholeness 
wherein there is no feelings of 




The condition of feeling alienated 
from God because of some default and 
breach of expectation. It involves 
feelings of sadness, discomfort and 
self-worthlessness because the indi-
vidual acknowledges his deviation 
that makes him unacceptable accord-
ing to the standards of God. These 
standards relate to and are formu-
lated in an ethical code of beha-
viour. Specific contraventions 
are thus sins. 
The psychodynamic construct of 
the centre of internalized socio-
religious values which evaluates 
the ego's management of the id 
and initiates psychic conflict 
and tension when it perceives 
mismanagement. 
To facilitate self-redemption through 
constructive action to repair damaged 
relationships with God, others and 
aspects of the self so that the in-
dividual is released from feelings 
of disequilibrit.111. 
To establish exactly what individuals believe 
about themselves and their worlds and how 
this is integrated or responded to so that 
the networks of cause and effect can be 
identified and intervention, correction, 
and assessment can be accurate and effectiv. 
To align notions of salvation to well-being 
by recognizing and developing the religious 
dimensions of the health of the whole person. 
This thus involves their spiritual needs 
and dynamics as well as physical, mental 
and emotional. 
To differentiate between sin and feelings 
of sinfulness attached to specific sins. 
The rational element in both situations 
needs to be analysed so that constructive 
restitution can be brought about. In ad-
dition, sin, as that which refers to 
feelings of disloyalty to hunan expecta~ 
tions, needs to be seen as debilitating 
as religiously determined 'sin'. 
To remember this is a theoretical 
construct that is different to the 
related theoretical construct of the 
conscience. The superego identifies 
mismanagement and initiates tension and 
conflict. The conscience does this as 
well as feeling the resultant discomfort 
and does so in relation to specific is-
sues. Thus there are different kinds 





usefulness of this vocabulary is of 
the psychotherapists' and 




acceptance of the 
emerged from the 
examination of the two realms of discourse in this thesis, 
it would appear that such acceptance is a logical and 
reasonable response. This kind of response is appropriate 
because, as has been shown, the differences in the two realms 
of discourse of psychology and religion have been exaggerated 
at the expense of their similarities in mental health concerns. 
The new translations are therefore suggested as viable 
understandings of concepts from each realm which better 
explains how everyday mental heal th concerns can more 
effectively be broached, by clergyman or psychotherapist. 
Ruth Barnhouse ( 1983) has drawn some useful conclusions that 
confirm this.35 She works from the proposal for a 'practical 
theology' by John Deschner ( 19 81) • This theology of action 
is proposed as a more adequate theology. In the words of 
Dorothy Sayers (1949), "the interpretation and control of 
the problems of everyday life" could be more effectively 
managed by such a theology. Deschner's categories of working, 
fellowship and service, the three components of the life 
of a congregation, are interrelated. They are thus connected 
to the four problem areas Barnhouse identifies as the basics 
of everyday life. These are leisure, work, sex and friendship. 
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These problem areas are all grounds for dissonance, when 
actions or thoughts to do with them contravene the expected 
at personal and socio-religious levels. The psychotherapist 
or clergyman has to deal with the debilitative results of 
such dissonance. The Church, in principle, provides support 
systems to alleviate and control the possibility of such 
dissonance within its congregational care of the needs of 
leisure, work, sex and friendship, when individuals accept 
what the Church expected with regard to these basics of every-
day life. When acceptance does not occur or causes dissonance 
through sin or guilt, the individual can resort to the psycho-
therapist or priest for help in resolving their dissonance. 
Psychoanalysis and the Sacrament of Penance may differ but 
nevertheless have some similarities in approaching dissonance. 
Both aim to restore the individual to an emotionally and 
mentally healthy disposition wherein the sin or egocentricism 
that causes problems is redirected or eliminated. This 




or inner discord of such problems, as 
hampering the individual's integrity. Both 
to relieve the individual from debilitating 
thoughts and behaviours. 
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Both psychoanalysis and confession can and should therefore 
work in a combined effort to facilitate the individual's 
consonance in the spiritual and psychological spheres. This 
combination would enable individuals to respond to their 
total environments appropriately and effectively. That the 
one includes God and the other does not, is not necessarily 
a problem. It depends on how religion, God and mental health 
are defined. 
The reason the two discourses are not complementary and working 
together is due to their differing assumptions, presuppositions 
and conceptions of individual functioning. The fact that 
they are both inevitably dealing with the same issues and 
implications in mental health suggests that their theoretical 
constructs could usefully be aligned in a reformulation of 
terms and concepts relating to mental health. The dissonance 
of guilt seems to provide an ideal means for doing this task 
of translation.36 
4.3 
THE NEW FRAMEWORK 
Releasing the patient from debilitating feelings of dissonance 
and restoring the individual to a state of mental health 
are two tasks for psychotherapists and Christian counsellors. 
That they both have these tasks and have the same goal means 
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that what they have in common needs to be identified and 
developed. Areas of disagreement or opposition can thereby 
be reduced or negated. 
Two steps need to be taken to expedite this process of unifica-
tion. Firstly, an exhaustive case history of the patient's 
religious background and predelictions ought to be accumulated. 
(A modified assessment outline is presented in Appendix E.) 
Secondly, psychotherapists and religious counsellors need 
to be adequately trained in the psychological principles 
of religion. They also need to know more about the basic 
assumptions of the different religions and the implications 
of these.37 
From this information and this knowledge, the patient's world 
view, self-concept and expectations can be more comprehensively 
and accurately assessed. Inferences about the patient's 
thoughts and behaviours can be reviewed more meaningfully. 
By establishing the role religion plays in the life of the 
individual, psychotherapists will thus not dismiss religious 
considerations as irrelevant. In addition, instead of concen-
trating on religion's possible negative effects, they can 
also come to respect its possible positive effects. 
The positive effects of religion for mental health are im-
portant considerations.38 They are evident in several of 
the Christian Church's functions and activities. For example, 
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the confession of sins serves as a means for reducing dis-
sonance, resolving tension and moral conflict. It does so 
by restoring consonance and harmony through absolution. In 
a similar way the Church's symbolism may be a source of 
restorative attributes for the unconscious mind. Carl Jung's 
notion of the collective unconscious suggests that in this 
way the Church's fatherly, motherly, protective; positive 
qualities may be a source of calm for the troubled person. 
However, with the deterioration of the Church's significance, 
especially with regard to the nature and implication of contra-
vening the expectations of God, individuals have conceived 
and conceded failure in other terms. In other words, sin 
and sins, in the Christian conception of things, have become 
almost meaningless concepts. Many people, remaining cognizant 
of their Christian ethos and ethical obligations, have never-
theless devalued and de-emphasized the Church's role as a 
means for dealing with dissonance. The salvation the Church 
offers is thus seen as distinct from the healing available 
from secular, psychotherapeutic means for failure to meet 
one's own expectations and live appropriately.39 
Barnhouse has pointed out that salvation and healing are 
actually etymologically contiguous.40 Their current dichotomy 
in thought and language is, she argues, the result of the 
separation between religion and medicine in the West. This 
incorrect dichotomy verifies the need for a recombining of 
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psychological and religious resources in effecting the salva-
tion and health synonymous with consonance. This recombination 
is necessary because, as human individuals are whole uni ts 
with different aspects, so different focuses on the human 
being need to be cognizant of each other's conceptions. Thus, 
psychology and religion, complex entities of knowledge in 
their own spheres,/ should not be negated in condescension 
to the other. Rather they should refine and clarify their 
findings with reference to the other. 
Thus confession and· restitution, as useful and effective 
psychotherapeutic means, need to be understood and examined 
in these terms by psychotherapists and clergymen. This cross-
ref erence is necessary because in psychoanalysis the patient 
is inevitably also confessing. But, invariably, there is 
a danger that appropriate restitution is not realized. This 
failure can mean that the patient never feels totally healed 
because the dimension of religious salvation has not been 
touched. Clearly the religious component of each human indi-
vidual has to be identified, assessed and catered for. 
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CONCLUSION 
The points of translation in which the endeavours of psycho-
therapists and religionists meet indicates that in dealing 
with the dissonance of guilt they could usefully refer to 
and integrate some of the formulations of the other. Both 
have developed substantial systems of discourse which usefully 
address specific aspects of the human condition. Consequently, 
an amalgamation of their separate systems should therefore 
result in a more comprehensive and effective approach to 
two of the principal aspects of the human condition, namely 
its religious and psychological dimensions. 
That the procedures and results of confession and psycho-
analysis share similarities confirms that such an amalgamated 
dialogue could facilitate the alleviation of unnecessary 
psychological or religious dissonance. The dissonance could 
be resolved by more accurate comprehension of the one by 
the other as patient or penitent, therapist or clergyman 
were enabled to more directly articulate and identify the 
areas of dissonance inherent in each. 
The table of alternative new definitions of relevant terms 
and concepts from both discourses for use in such a new brid-
ging discourse, thus consists and results from conclusions 
found in the development of this thesis. They are particularly 
concerned with the dissonance of guilt feelings. These find-
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ings accordingly verify and emphasize the ubiquitous importance 
of these fundamental feelings in the human condition. How 
t hese feelings of guilt need to and can be dealt with 
effectively involves looking at the dissonance not only in 
terms of its psychological consequences, but also at religious 
causes and implications. Only these methods will ensure 
that the whole person's present condition is adequately 
assessed in the psychotherapeutic process and specific 





Individuals have experienced the agonies of the dissonance 
of guilt since the beginning of human self-awareness. Adam, 
David and Job are individuals who paradigmatically suffer 
from it in Biblical religious discourse that is thousands 
of years old. More modern writers, Shakespeare, Dickens 
and Dostoevsky for example, have proliferated the literary 
world and vicarious experience with many other guilty charac-
ters. Philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and others 
interested in understanding the human condition have similarly 
formulated ideas, albeit more explicitly, about the meaning 
and implications of the individual who feels guilty. Clearly, 
the dissonance of guilt is a fairly ubiquitous feature of 
human experience. 
This thesis has accordingly attempted to clarify the centrality 
of guilt feelings to the human condition, 
ramifications for mental health in order 
and its religious 
that counselling 
discourse can be re-construed. Reconstrual has been necessary 
because psychotherapy is historically linked with and conse-
quently influenced by Freud's revolt against religion and 
his views of religiously induced guilt as misdirected and 
wasteful fears. Basically, Freud was hostile to religion 
and consequently neglected to consider its possible positive 
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effects by concentrating his efforts only on its negative 
possibilities. Contemporary Christian Pastoral Counsellors, 
and psychologists interested in Eastern psycho-philosophies, 
have worked to redress this situation of disparate and 
conflicting discourse about what can and should be done about 
mental health. 
Reviews in Contemporary Psychology (1986 31 (2) pp 85-88) 
on two recent books, Working With Religious Issues in Therapy 
(R.J. Lovinger (1984) and Psychotherapy of the Religious 
Patient (M.H. Spero (Id) (1985) by Allen E. Bergin and 
Hirsch Lazaar Silverman, indicate that the task of re-aligning 
the relationship between psychotherapeutic and religious 
factors is at a significant stage which marks the beginning 
of a new era in the psychotherapeutic task of mental health 
care of the whole individual. This thesis has been an attempt 
to assist in this re-alignment. 
Accordingly, in terms of what this thesis has established 
in an attempt to continue the dialogue, the following conclu-
sions are proposed in support of the need to unite the resour-
ces of psychology and of religion to more effectively deal 
with the totality of the human condition. 
(1) Mental health, assessment, religion and the ideal 
Mental heal th is an assessment of the condition of the inner 
environment of an individual. Religion not only assesses 
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this condition but also affects the assessment. This is 
because systems of religion formulate particular conceptions 
of ideal behaviour, to differentiate between appropriate 
and inappropriate, normal and abnormal. Accordingly, indi-
viduals are assessed with reference to the conception of 
the ideal, appropriate and normal and these conceptions are 
invariably meta-theoretical constructs which identify socio-
and psychopathologies as ascribed to by psychologists. 
(2) The consciousness of guilt feelings 
Guilt feelings are conscious elements 
feeling guilty with the dissonance 
consciousness of such effects. That 
of the condition of 
experienced being the 
is, the dissonance of 
guilt is dissonance that occurs primarily because cognitions 
conflict. The reasons and implications of their conflict 
initiates feelings of regret and remorse. These generate 
guilt feelings 
beings as they 
because individuals feel lessened as human 
reflect upon who they are in self-awareness 
and self-evaluation. 
(3) The unconscious effects of dissonance 
Unconscious forms and levels of dissonance, as construed 
in psychodynamic conflict in Freud' s theory, means troubling 
repressed consciouss in the unconscious, that prove debilita-
ting, need to be brought to consciousness. At this level 
of awareness, the role of the psychoanalytic psycotherapist 
is operative so that consonance can be restored. Psychosomatic 
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and accident-proneness as results of repressed unconscious 
guilt feelings are interesting speculations but further re-
search needs to be undertaken to establish the extent of 
any relationship between the unconscious and such results. 
( 4) Guilt feelings, dissonance and punishment 
Guilt feelings are the result of dissonance. As such they 
are part of the self-punishment the individual experiences 
and exercises in lieu of punishment that may or may not be 
expected as the result of the reasons for feeling guilty. 
These expectations occur when 
to punitive consequences from 
is, dissonance is the primary 
wrongdoing is 
other outside 
area of such 
seen to lead 
sources. That 
consciousness 
and affect. The 
become debilitating 
guilt feelings are secondary. They may 
in addition to the negative effects the 
dissonance can have on the individual's optimal functioning. 
Hence, there can be dissonance with no concomitant feelings 
of guilt, but rarely are guilt feelings explicable when there 
are no immediate conscious elements of dissonance. 
(5) The debilitating effects of the dissonance of guilt 
Dissonance and guilt are debilitating because of the negative 
effects they have on the individual's identity and personality 
functioning. They undermine and threaten the individual's 
sense of integrity and wholeness with confusion, discord 
and instability in the inner environment. This state of 
affairs can initiate lowered self-esteem, and can produce 
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an individual not only at war within but also at war with 
others when feelings of personal meaning and belonging are 
i n doubt. Clearly psychology and religion have a role to 
play in replacing debilitating doubts and a sense of security 
and meaning. 
( 6) Psychology, religion and individual biographical goals 
The present condition of the individual and what led to it 
is the concern of psychology. As such, psychology is 
essentially biography. Religion is similarly interested 
in biography but in addition seeks to understand and cater 
for the ultimate objectives of the individual. That is, 
religion 
totality 
asks, and propounds to 
of the individual in 
answer, questions about the 
the totality of his or her 
environment and is also concerned about ultimate goals rather 
than only survival and present condition. This concern is 
because, for religion, survival means maximising all possible 
goals and defining these goals. Consequently, for religion, 
goals are more important than survival as they give meaning 
and inspiration to the need for survival. 
( 7) The need to resolve and absolve 
The need to resolve feelings of dissonance and absolve con-
comitant feelings of guilt in the conscience is related to 
the quest for a harmonious self-identity. This is because 
it is important to know and accept who one really is. Other-
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wise, anomie and alienation, products of the dissonance of 
guilt, occur when feelings of guilt isolate individuals from 
others. Potentials for self-improvement are enfeebled when 
religion and psychology do not jointly share in the task 
of enabling the individual to ask and to answer the question 
'Who am I?' satisfactorily. 
(8) Goals and guilt 
There are no goals without guilt. This suggests that by 
getting rid of goals and paradigms of socio-religious reality 
that propound goal-seeking and goal-oriented behaviours, 
the problem of the dissonance of guilt could be eradicated. 
However, it would appear that humankind is inevitably vul-
nerable to feeling culpable and feeling guilty about it. 
This inevitability occurs because each individual is ultimately 
able to make choices, evaluate their decisions and feel guilty 
about them and their outcomes if this is deemed appropriate 
by the individual. 
(9) Goals and God(s) 
Similarly there is an argument that if the concept of God 
was removed from human consciousness, guilt could be eradica-
ted. However, the concept of God can be construed to include 
concepts of normalcy, expected and appropriate. So, whether 
these concepts are centralized as ideals originating in God, 
as in the Judaeo-Christian Biblical tradition, or in nature, 










of guilt is 
Individuals 
invariably compare themselves to the paradigmatic model, 
evaluate their situation in terms of it, and consequently 
feel dissonance about the difference between the model and 
themselves if there are any grounds for discrepancies and 
conflicts. 
(10) The economic dynamic in the dissonance of guilt 
The economic dynamic evident in the wrongdoing-guilt-restitu-
tion nexus interestingly echoes Christian notions of redemption 
and psychoanalytic notions of rehabilitation. These notions 
indicate again the inevitable process and presence of guilt 
feelings as integrants of human experience because when wrong-
doing, deviance or impropriety occur, it needs to be made 
right through some sort of compensation in order that the 
dissonance of the guilt feelings do not become debilitative. 
(11) Value orientations and dissonating cognitions 
The individual's value orientations are closely connected 
to feelings of guilt and to interpretations of such feelings. 
Naturally a value orientation and its concomitant ethical 
obligations are · evident in certain religious conceptions 
and their realization in the conscience. These realizations 
are most closely related to, and expressive of, an awareness 
of guilt feelings because values are the very tissue of the 
dissonating cognitions as they differ and conflict. Without 
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values and their differing proportioning of worth, cognitions 
would differ and conflict in negligible ways. 
(12) Dealing with the past affects the present 
Articulation of inner environment feelings by the patient 
is as important as his or her acceptance of the role of the 
listener as a means for attaining mental health. It is 
accordingly important to acknowledge the usefulness of others 
in general for the sharing of secrets and the admission of 
transgressions. This sharing and admission ensures that 
freedom of expression achieves freedom from the debilitating 
dissonance caused from fear of punishment, or fear of being 
found out, because of the nature of the secreted 
transgressions. Past errors and disappointments need to 
be dealt with consciously and positively in the present. 
Doing so ensures that the present is not held hostage by 
the past, and life is lived to its optimal benefits in a 
socially, and psychologically, healthy inner environment 
shared with others enjoying similar well-being. 
(13) Dealing with dissonance 
Psychologically, the dissonance of guilt is dealt with by 
the individual through repression, projection, compensation, 
rationalization, self-justification and other cognitive strate-
gies to establish inner harmony and consonance. Christianity 
suggests that individuals deal with the dissonance of guilt 
with self-examination, confession through repentance, and 
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requesting absolution and restitution through forgiveness. 
Both realms of discourse use these different concepts and 
terms and yet are seeking the same goal and almost using 
similar means. Clearly more explicitly shared concepts and 
terms would usefully advantage them both to bring about feel-
ings of restitution in psychotherapy and more cognitive conson-
ance in confession. Such results would be in distinction 
to the situation that often occurs when individuals never 
quite achieve these results in any sort of allied formulation 
and never feel 'restored' or 'forgiven'. 
(14) Guilt feelings are ultimately personal and unavoidable 
The various sources of guilt feelings, from parents, children, 
lovers and relationships with them, from institutional dynamics 
such as schools and churches, from values attached to sex, 
money, death, careers, possessions and education, as well 
as everyday guilt-inducing events such as littering, breaking 
diet or not paying busfare, all centre eventually on the 
inner experience and feelings of the individual. When these 
are experienced as dissonant feelings of guilt, they need 
to be resolved if the individual is not to be debilitated. 
(15) Religion and psychotherapists 
Religious values and beliefs need to be taken seriously as 
potentially positive integrants for adjustment and personal 
growth. The stigmas 
therapeutic literature 
associated with religiosity in psycho-
and by psychotherapists needs to be 
149 
more rigorously disputed. Religious values and beliefs are, 
by their natures, very personal issues. Psychotherapists 
need therefore to cautiously but effectively enter the domain 
of a patient's religion so that the nature and implications 
of the patient's religious beliefs, experiences and predelic-
tions can be identified and assessed. 
(16) Effective mental health care in shared psychological 
and religious discourse 
A more holistic perspective of what psychotherapeutic services 
could and should be doing needs to advocate and adhere to 
the realization that mental health involves and includes 
the spiritual-religious dimension of human experience. 
Disparities in religious and psychological discourse need 
to be rigorously re-examined in order that the two realms 
might better co-operate in creating a shared discourse for 
effective mental health care in which the body, mind and 
soul of the individual are all equally considered. 
These conclusions all relate to the importance of language 
of areas of expertise about the human condition being better 
understood and used by the people who refer to it. That 
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is, experts, as therapists or clergymen, or the laity, as 
patients or others, need to be able to communicate theories 
and feelings proficiently so that the care and cure of problems 
in the human condition are not impeded by theoretical ab-
stractions rendered useless in jargon. To this end, the 
redefinitions presented in this thesis, resulting from the 
examination of two principal realms of religious and psycho-
logical discourse, hopefully assist in making two useful 
paradigmatic statements about 
Freud's theory and Biblical 
the human condition, namely 
Christianity, more manageable 
points of reference for effective mental health care. 
Much could be said about what this thesis is not. Clearly 
other points of reference in other systems of religion and 
psychological theory could have been used. Similarly, the 
two paradigmatic statements of Freud and Christianity that 
were selected could have been examined more rigorously and 
in different ways. These alternative approaches would however 
have detracted from the intentions of this thesis, which 
were to examine the dissonance of guilt feelings, and establish 
how religion could assist psychotherapists to deal with them, 
by translating between the realms of religious and psycho-
logical discourse to indicate how these realms share in the 
task of mental health care. 
The dissonance of guilt feelings, as a major factor in human 
experience, and hence in psychopathology, is of course a 
socio-religiously 
sonance of guilt 
in certain types 
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determined phenomena. 
feelings result in 
of societies which 
That is, the dis-
individuals who live 
cause individuals to 
be especially introspective, egocentric, self-evaluating 
and goal-oriented. Such self-interestedness inevitably focuses 
on the individual's concerns far more on his or her own 
performance 
goals that 
and status, in terms of 
are impinged onto the 




individual by the society, than may otherwise happen in other 
societies. 
The suggestion that the dissonance of guilt feelings are 
the particular result of particular societies and their reli-
gious constructs, relates to earlier conclusions about the 
role of God ( s) and goals in the human condition. Clearly, 
further research into the cause, processes and results of 
socio-religious dynamics in human experience is necessary 
to establish, more accurately, the situation in this regard. 
Similarly, further empirical research into the nature, causes, 
implications and ubiquity of the dissonance of guilt feelings 
would further serve to verify the claims of this thesis. 
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APPENDIX A 
LEWIS, H.B. TABLE OF SU"'4ARY OF WORKING CONCEPT OF SHAME AND GUILT 
Stimulus 
Extent of libidinal 
component 
Conscious content 
Position of self in 
field 
Nature and discharge of 
Characteristic defences 
SHAME 
1. Disappointment, defeat 
or moral transgression 
2. Deficiency of self 
3. Involuntary, self 
unable 
4. Encounters with "other" 
or within the self 
1. Specific connection 
to sex 
1. Painful emotion 
2. Autonomic reactions 
3. Connections to past 
feeling 
4. Many variants of 
shame feeling 
5. Fewer variations of 
cognitive content 
(the self) 
6. Identity thoughts 
1. Self passive 
2. Self focal in 
awareness 
3. Multiple functions of 
self at the same time 
4. Vicarious experience 
of "other's" view of 
self 
1. Humiliated fury 
2. Discharge blocked by 
guilt and/or love of 
"other" discharge on 
self 
1. Denial 
2. Repression of ideas 
3. Affinnation of the self 
4. Affect disorder: 
depression 
(in Izard, C.E. (1979) see note 44, Chapter One) 
GUILT 
1. Moral transgression 
2. Event, act, thing 
for which self is 
responsible 
3. Voluntary, self 
able 
4. Within the self 
1. Connection to 
aggression 
1. Affect may or may 
not be present 
2. Autonomic reactions 
less 1 i kely 
3. Fewer connections 
to past feelings 
4. Guilt feeling is 
monotonic 
5. More variations of 
content-things in 
the world 
6. No identity thoughts 
1. Self active 
2. Self not focal in 
awareness 
3. Self intact, function-
ing silently 
4. Pity, concern for 
"other's" suffering 
1. Righteous indignati on 
2. Discharge on self and 
"other" 
1. Isolation of affect 
2. Rationalization 
3. Reaction fonnation: 
good deeds or thoughts 
4. Thought disorder: 
obsession and paranoia 
APPENDIX 8 
SUIIIARY TABLE OF ID, EGO AHO SUPEREGO 





instinctual from reflex 





conscious regulating, from id's principle 
EGO and executive 
psychic 
unconscious agent energies 
secondary 
process 
from id's conscience 
primarily critica 1 
psychic 
SUPEREGO unconscious agent 





DEVELOPED ENVIRONMENT l REPRESSION 
FROM 
instinctual internal 
is what is 
needs repressed 
need to is the 
interact external repressing 
rea11sticly & internal force -




behave & internal 
powers the 
think in 
& exter- ego's re-socially pressing 





































PROCEDURE IN THE CONFESSIONAL 
ACT OF CONTRITION 
(by the penitent) 
O my God, I am heartily sorry 
for having offended Thee, and 
I detest all my sins, because 
I dread the loss of heaven 
and the pains of hell but 
most of all because they 
offend thee, my God, Who art 
all good and deserving of my 
love. I firmly resolve, with 
the help of Thy grace, to con-
fess my sins, to do penance, 
and to amend my life. 
Amen. 
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FORM OF THE ABSOLUTION* 
(said by the priest to the 
penitent) 
May Our Lord Jesus Christ 
absolve thee, and I, by His 
authority, absolve thee from 
every bond of excommunication 
and interdict, according to 
my power and your need. There-
fore, I absolve thee from thy 
sins, in the name of the Father 
and of the Son, and of the Holy 
Ghost. 
Amen. 
*This is or used to be said in 
Latin. 
Belgum, D. (1970) Guilt: Where Psychology 
and Theology Meet, p 69. 
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APPENDIX D 
DAY OF ATONEMENT STATEMENT 
May it therefore be thy will, O Lord our God and God of our 
fathers, to forgive us all our sins, to pardon us all our 
iniquities, and to grant us atonement for all our transgres-
sions. 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee under compulsion 
or of freewill, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by hardening 
of the heart; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee unwittingly, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee with utter-
ance of the lips; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by unchastity, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee openly 
and secretly; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee knowlingly 
and deceitfully, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in speech; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by wronging 
a neighbour, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in the 
meditation of the heart; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by association 
with impurity, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by con-
fession of the lips; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by despising 
parents and teachers, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in presump-
tion and in error; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by violence, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by violence, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by the 
profanation of thy Name; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by impurity 
of the lips, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by foolish 
speech; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by the evil 
inclination, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee wittingly 
or unwittingly. 
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And for all these; O God of forgiveness, forgive 
us, pardon us, grant us atonement. 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by denying 
and lying, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by bribery; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by scoffing, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by evil 
speech; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in business, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee in eating 
and drinking; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by usury and 
increase, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by an 
arrogant mien; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by the utter-
ances of our lips, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by a wanton 
glance, 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee with haughty 
eyes, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee with ob-
durate brow. 
And for all these, O God of forgiveness, forgive 
us, pardon us, grant us atonement. 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by breaking 
off the yoke. 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by conten-
tiousness; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by ensnaring 
our neighbour, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by envy; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by levity, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by being 
stiff-necked; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by running 
to do evil, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by tale-
bearing; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by a vain 
oath, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by causeless 
hatred; 
For the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by a breach 
of trust, 
And for the sin wherein we have sinned before thee by terror 
of the heart. 
And for all these, O God of forgiveness, forgive 
us, pardon, grant us atonement. 
And for the sins for which we owe a burnt offering; 
And for the sins for which we owe a sin-offering; 
And for the sins for which we owe an offering according to 
our ability; 
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And for the sins for which we owe a trespass-offering for 
certain guilt and a trespass-offering for doubtful guilt; 
And for the sins for which we deserve corporal chastisement; 
And for the sins for which we deserve the punishment of forty 
stripes; 
And for the sins for which we deserve death by the hand of 
God; 
And for the sins for which we deserve the punishment of exci-
sion, and of being childless; 
And for all these, O God of forgiveness, forgive 
us, pardon us, grant us atonement. 
And for the sins for which we deserve the four kinds of death 
inflicted by the Court of Law: stoning, burning, 
beheading and strangling. 
For the breach of positive commands, and for the breach of 
negative commands, whether an action be involved or not; 
both for the sins that are known unto us and those that are 
unknown to us. Those that are known unto us we have already 
avowed before thee, and we have made acknowledgement of them 
unto thee: and those that are unknown to us, lo, they are 
revealed and known unto thee, according to the word which 
has been said: The secret things belong unto the Lord our 
God, but the revealed things belong unto us, and unto our 
children for ever, that we may do all the words of this Law. 
from Routledge and Kegan Paul (1st ed.) 1955 Service of 
the Synagogue : A New Edition of The Festival Prayers with 
an English Translation in Prose and Verse. 
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APPENDIX E 
A REVISED ASSESSMENT OUTLINE 
The questions of the format presented below are suggested 
as part of the procedure for use by therapists in obtaining 
information about the patient's presenting problems. This 
format specifically seeks to obtain religious information 
to ensure a more holistic assessment of the patient. 
ASSESSMENT OUTLINE: 
What were the reasons/circumstances of the referral? 
an account of how the condition eventuated and how the 
patient came to be seeking therapy. 
What is the presenting problem? 
an account of the present condition of the patient. 
What is the history of the problem? 
including here details of the patient's life events, 
family history, attempts to cope with the problems, 
attitudes towards the problem, where pertinent. 
What is the personal history of the patient? 
A fuller account of the individual clarifying and expand-
ing on information already mentioned in detailing the 
history of the problem; here religious influences and 
predelictions need to be identified and assessed. 
What is the history of the patient's family? 
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A full account of family members, significant others, 
the home, the religious background, assessing family 
functioning, noting particular details pertinent to 
the patient's problem and situation. 
What is the basic personality of the patient? 
Developmental features, looking at education, psychosexual 
maturation, social functioning, activities and habits, 
personality traits, attitudes and values, predominant 
moods and expression. This should explicitly refer 
to any religious influences and expressions. 
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1 The environment meaning all that is the 'world out there' and not the 
individual per se. It includes others, objects, events, values, atti-
tudes, systems of thought, tradition, society, etc. and not what is 
the individual and his/her inner environment of thought and feeling. 
2. Drives are what, at a meta theoretical level, has the status of theoretic-
al explanatory devices which may or may not exist as bodily processes 
(eg. hunger as opposed to survival). 
3. Freud, S. (1983) New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. London: 
Penguin, p 113. 
(Note: hereafter this text will be referred to as NILOP only, with 
page number.) Also, for desires in ethical discourse, see Chidester, 
D. (1987). Patterns of Action: Religion and Ethics in a Comparative 
Perspective. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Press. 
4. Freud, S. NILOP, p 106. 
5. Miller, N.E. (1944) Experimental Studies of Conflict. In J.McV. Hunt 
(ed) Personality and the behaviour disorders. New York: Ronald Press. 
6. Definitions of what mental health is and what it is not abound. For 
the purposes of this thesis it is taken to refer to an ideal of function-
ing as a person that accords to norms and va 1 ues of a particular sub-
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paradigm within a paradigm of reality which is Religion. That is, in 
the final analysis, each Religion determines what is and what is not 
mentally healthy. 
7. See Note 1, Chapter Two, and for dissonance, the implicit information 
in Freud's theory of the neurotic conflict and psychodynamic conflict. 
8. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston Illi -
nois: Ron Petersen. 
9. For Jung's views on Guilt, see Brooke, R. (1985) Jung and the Phenome-
nology of Guilt. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 30, pp 165-184. 
10. Differentiation between external (Shame) functions of conscience and 
internal (Guilt) functions of conscience have been theorized in the 
so-called Shame and Guilt Cultures of the East and West respectively. 
The work of Ruth Benedict ( 1946) in The Chrysanthymum and the Sword. 
Houghton Mifflin is a primary source. (This thesis has recently been 
disputed - see Epstein, A.L. (1984) The Experience of Shame in Melanesia . 
Occasional Paper No. 40, Royal Anthropological Institute, London.) 
11. For an extensive phenomenological study on conscience, the work of Parker, 
M. (1985) is invaluable. The title of this (unpublished) Masters Thes is 
is A Phenomenal ogi ca 1 Analysis of the Psycho l ogi cal Manifestations of 
Ontic Conscience as derived from Heidegger's Ontological Concepti on 
of that phenomenon. (Rhodes University, Grahamstown) 
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12. See note 6 above. 
13. Pierce, C.A. (1958) Conscience in the New Testament. London: SCM 
Press, p 115. 
14. MacQuarrie, J. (1970) "The Struggle of Conscience for Authentic Selfhood" 
in Conscience, C. Ellis Nelson (ed) (1973) New York: Newman Press, 
pp 155-166, usefully considers this with reference to issues in Ethics. 
(Hereafter references from this edited text wi 11 be noted uncer Con-
science.) 
15. Tillich, P. (1955) "The Nature of a Liberating Conscience" in Conscience, 
pp 62-71, argues how these demands are allied to a fundamental need 
for morality in the human condition. 
16. Buber, M., (1965) 'Guilt and Guilt Feelings' in Conscience, p 235. 
17. Fronvn, E. (1958) Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, differentiated in a similar way between Authoritarian 
and Humanitarian forms of conscience. The former debilitates with fears 
of punishment whilst the latter serves to ensure productivity and 
rationality. 
18. op cit Note 13 above. 
19. Ibid, pp 21 ff. 
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20. These two books provide further information in this regard: 
Button, E. ( 1985) Persona 1 Construct Theory and Men ta 1 Hea 1th, London: 
Croom Helm, presents an up to date and comprehensive review of the theory 
and practice of this approach and how it can deal with the consequences 
of the conscience. 
Butler, J. (1964) Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and a 
Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue. London: G. Bell & Sons. This 
gives a comprehensive exposition of the nature of man, and the normative 
nature of the demands and functions of the conscience. 
21. Heller, A. (1979) A Theory of Feelings. The Netherlands: Van Gorcum 
presents an alternative point of view to this in the form of a Marxist 
anthropology of feelings. 
22. Issues related to temptation and its implications are another vast topic 
altogether. Basically they are related to issues in Christi an Religion 
with temptation seen as incitement to sin and consequent behaviours 
contrary to the obligations of the religion. 
23. Coleman, J.C. (7th ed) (1984) Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life. 
New York: Scott Foresman, is a most useful source book for further 
details of cases in this regard. 
24. Wright, D. (1983) The Psychology of Moral Behaviour. Great Britain: 
Penguin. 
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25. See Chapter Four for other strategies of reparation. 
26. See Greenspan, P.S. (1983) Moral Dilemmas and Guilt in Philosophical 
Studies, 43, pp 117-125, for an interesting consideration of this in 
tenns of the novel Sophie's Choice by William Styron (1980). 
27. In Conscience {op cit) pp 11-20 - Guilt Ethics and Religion. 
28. See differentiation in Chapter Three. 
29. For detailed description of phenomenology of authenticity versus inauthen-
ticity see Parker, M.A. (op cit Note 11), pp 16-26 and pp 33-41. 
30. An article by Rev. Edward C. Sellner, OSC, usefully looks at a case 
hi story in this regard and suggests a strategy for Pastoral Counselling 
to deal with such a situation. The article is entitled The Question 
of Guilt in the Search for Identity: A Case-Study, in Journal of Pastoral 
Counselling, 1Q (1975), pp 42-55. 
31. The Psychology Today Questionnaire - Isn't It Right - An Enquiry into 
Everyday Ethics (June 1981) and the consequent reported findings (November 
1981) produce some startling results in this regard. 
32. Wright, D. op cit (Note 24 above). 
33. Useful books in this regard are: 
(1) Brighton, C.C. (1959) History of Western Morals. 
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(2) Frankena, W.K. (1963) Ethics. 
(3) Hospers, J. (1961) Human Conduct. 
34. The 10 Commandments of the Law of Moses (Exodus 20) and the New Command-
ment of Jesus (John 13:34) are examples of this. 
35. Chidester, D. op cit Note 3 above. 
36. Ibid, p 111. 
37. Thoules, R. (1971) An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion. 
London: Cambridge University Press. 
38. Ibid, p 39. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Nietzsche, F. (1969) On the Genealogy of Morals (transl. Kaufman, W. 
and Hollingdale, R.J.). New York: Random House. 
41. Chidester, ibid, p 212. 
42. Ibid, p 246. 
43. The nature, issues and implications of this situation are interestingly 
developed in an article Existential Neurosis by Maddi, S.R. (1967) in 
Journal of Abnonnal Psychology, .i, pp 311-325, 
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and in a book Existential Guilt by Morano, D.V. (1973). Assen: Van 
Gorcum. 
44. Rorty, A.I. (Ed) (1980) Explaining Emotions, London: UCP, is a very 
useful source book for understanding human emotions and theories of 
them, as is 
Izard, C.E. (Ed) (1979) Emotions in Personality and Psychopathology. 
New York: Plenum Press. 
45. See Lewis, H.B. article Shame in Depression and Hysteria in Izard (..QE. 
cit 29 above) and 
Hesselgrave, D.J. (1983) Missionary Elenctics and Guilt and Shame in 
Missiology: An International Review, .!l, pp 461-483. 
46. Ausubel, D.P. (1955) Relationships Between Shame and Guilt in the 
Socializing Process. Psychological Review,~ (5). 
Lewis, HB. (1979) op cit above Note 45. 
Benedict, R. (1946) op cit above Note 10. 
Piers, G. & Singer, M. (1971) Shame and Guilt. New York: Norton. 
Thrane, G. (1979) Shame in Journal of Theory of Social Behaviour, 9 
(2), pp 139-166. 
Shinn, R.L. (1976) The Baffling Mix of Confusion and Guilt. Union Semi -
nary Quarterly Review, l!., Winter, pp 126-136. 
47. Ausubel op cit, p 379. 
48. Ibid, p 382. 
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49. Ibid, p 383. 
50. Ibid, p 385. 
51. This is also the assumption of this thesis. 
52. The work of Donald Mosher in the research of guilt feelings is an 
outstanding contribution in documenting and quantifying the nature and 
range of these discrepancies and the feelings they involve. A full 
listing of Masher's work can be found in Izard op cit, pp 124-129. (Note 
45 above.) 
53. Lewis op cit, Note 46 above. 
54. This relates to theories of Locus of Control as researched and posited 
by Rotter, J.B. (1966) and interestingly re-examined by Lawrence Breen 
and Terry Prociuk (1976) looking at Internal-External Locus of Control 
and Guilt in Journal of Clinical Psychology, 1f. (2), p 301-302, 
55. Chidester, D. op cit, pp 209-210. 
56. Ibid, p 210. 
57. Averill, J.R. (1976) Emotion and Anxiety: Determinants in Rorty, A.I. 
(1980) Explaining Emotions, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
58. Buber, M. (1965) "Guilt and Guilt Feelings" in Conscience, C. Ellis 
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Nelson (ed) (1973) New York: Newman Press, pp 224-237. 
59. A useful reference on this from another point of view is: 
Brooke, R. (1985) Jung and the Phenomenology of Guilt. Journal of 
Analytical Psychology, 30, 165-184. 
60. Chidester, op cit, p 251. 
61. See Bean, P. (Ed) ( 1983) Men ta 1 I 11 ness: Changes and Trends, New York: 
Wiley, for full coverage of this. 
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